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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CLAY HAMILTON PETTY, 
Case No. 20001038-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this third 
degree felony conviction from a court of record. 
The trial court signed the judgment, sentence and conviction on November 8, 
2000 (R. 148-49). 
Trial counsel signed the notice of appeal on November 14, 2000, and the clerk 
filed it on December 1, 2000 (R. 159-60). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION1 
1
 To the extent that any issue raised herein was not properly preserved 
at trial, counsel relies on the plain error and exceptional circumstances doctrines 
to raise the issues on appeal. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful 
error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the 
1 
1. Did the trial court err in permitting Petty to represent himself absent an 
adequate colloquy? 
This issue presents an application of law to fact, with some deference to 
the trial court and legal conclusions to be reviewed for correctness. See, e.g.. 
State v. McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 780-81 (Utah App. 1996). 
This issue was preserved when the trial court ruled that Petty could 
represent himself (&& T. 7/19/2000). £gg State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 
187-88 (Utah 1987)(placing burden on trial courts to fully assess propriety of 
criminal defendant's request to represent himself). 
2. Does the absence of a proper elements instruction require a new trial? 
This Court reviews the adequacy of jury instructions for correctness. See. 
&&, State v. Carruth. 947 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah App. 1997), gffd, 1999 UT 107, 
993 P.2d 869. 
obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which 
is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See., e.g.. 
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cejl denied. 493 U.S. 814 
(1989). 
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the 
plain error doctrine. Sgg, g ^ , United States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138,1140 
(10th Cir.), eejt denied. 145 LEd.2d 343 (1999). 
Courts will also reach issues raised for the first time on appeal when there 
are exceptional circumstances, such as serious procedural defects, which require 
the courts to act to prevent manifest injustices. §ge_, g ^ , State v. Gibbons. 740 
P.2d 1309,1311 (Utah 1987) (incomplete trial procedures and change of 
appellate counsel constituted exceptional circumstances); State v. Jameson. 800 
P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990)(serious procedural defects may constitute exceptional 
circumstances). 
2 
Petty relies on the plain error and exceptional circumstance doctrines in 
raising the issue. See n.1, supra.. 
3. Did the trial court err in refusing to dismiss this case because prosecuting 
Petty for possession of a firearm violated his constitutional right to bear arms? 
This constitutional issue is reviewed for correctness. SfiS. S4L., Ryan v. Gold 
Cross Servs.. Inc.. 903 P.2d 423,424 (Utah 1995). 
This issue was preserved when Petty moved to dismiss (e.g. R. 162 at 141-
42). 
To the extent that the issue was not fully preserved, Petty relies on the plain 
error and exceptional circumstances doctrines in raising the issue. See n.1, supra. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTES 
The following constitutional provision and statutes are central to this appeal: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I § 6 (2000) 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for the 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as 
well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing 
herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (2000) 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable 
mental state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute 
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose 
criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the 
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1999) 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Petty with one count, restricted person in possession of 
a dangerous weapon, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
10-503(3)(a) (i), for an event which occurred on or about August 17,1999 (R. 1). 
Petty requested appointed counsel, and Judge Lyle R. Anderson appointed 
Happy J. Morgan to represent Petty (R. 9,14). 
Judge Anderson acted as magistrate in presiding over the preliminary 
hearing, and ordered Petty bound over as charged (R. 27, 30). 
Petty pled not guilty at arraignment (R. 27). 
On July 19,2000, Ms. Morgan informed Judge Bryner, who was serving in 
Judge Anderson's absence, that Mr. Petty wanted her to withdraw from 
representing him, and Judge Bryner ordered Morgan to act as standby counsel, 
after asking Petty why he wanted to represent himself and informing him that he 
was doing himself a disservice (R. 40).2 
2
 The full colloquy and ruling are in Addendum 1 to this brief. 
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At trial, Judge Anderson limited the activities of standby counsel, describing 
her appointed role to the jury as follows: 
I - 1 - as an assistance to him and as is routine in such cases, I have 
assigned, ah, the Public Defender to sit with him at counsel table as what 
we call standby counsel. She can answer his questions and help him 
understand the procedures that are being followed in the courtroom, but it 
is not her responsibility to represent him. She is not to represent him. 
She's not to ask questions. She's not to speak for him. She's there as a 
resource to help him. 
(R. 162 at 11). 
The trial court instructed the jury that they could convict Petty for 
possession or transference of the gun (R. 109), but did not require the jurors to 
specify which factual theory supported their general conviction (R. 123). 
Following a jury trial, the jury convicted Petty as charged {R. 123). 
Prior to sentencing, Petty requested the appointment of counsel, and Judge 
Anderson appointed Ms. Morgan to act as counsel for Petty (R. 139). 
Judge Anderson sentenced Petty to a term of zero to five years in prison 
(R. 148). 
Counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 159). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the issues to be raised on appeal do not require an assessment of 
evidentiary prejudice, a truncated statement of facts will suffice. 
On August 17,1999, Petty signed and thumb printed a pawn ticket at a 
pawnshop indicating that he pawned a Norinco 45 pistol at B&G Pawn (e.g. R. 162 at 
52-56). 
5 
Petty maintained at trial that the gun belonged to his wife, and that he pawned it 
for her because she did not have her Identification with her at the pawnshop (e.g. R. 162 
at 113). 
The pawnshop owner testified that Petty had discussed pawning his gun 
repeatedly in the past, because the gun was too big for his wife and he was trying to find 
a smaller one (R. 162 at 63-64, 72) 
Petty's father-in-law testified that Petty showed him this gun on a prior occasion 
and referred to it as a gun that he or they had, but did not identify it as belonging to 
Petty's wife (R. 162 at 77). 
Petty testified that he did not touch the gun itself, but brought the gun to his 
father-in-law in a bag from his wife's car and referred to it as theirs because it made him 
feel "cool" (R. 162 at 114-116). 
He maintained that he knew, as a convicted felon, that he could not have a gun, 
and that he did not know that his actions with his wife's gun constituted a violation of the 
law(gigiR. 162 at 113-114). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The record fails to establish that Petty made a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
counsel. The trial court's colloquy improperly focused primarily on Petty's legal training, 
rather than on what he was giving up in representing himself. 
The elements instruction for the gun possession charge in this case was devoid 
of any mens rea element. 
The gun possession statute does not expressly create a strict liability offense, or 
specify any particular mens rea, thus requiring proof of a knowing or intentional, or 
6 
perhaps reckless mental state. 
Under well-established Utah law, the defective elements instruction requires a 
new trial. 
The trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the case because the gun possession 
statute violates Petty's right to bear arms. 
ARGUMENT 
L 
The Trial Court Erred in Permitting 
Petty to Represent Himself. 
On July 19,2000, Ms. Morgan informed Judge Bryner, who was 
substituting for Judge Anderson, that Mr. Petty wanted her to withdraw from 
representing him (R. 40). 
The full questioning and ruling by the court on this matter were as follow: 
THE COURT: All right. Now, Mr. - Mr. Petty, you're proposing 
to represent yourself; is that correct? 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Why are you making that choice? 
MR. PETTY: The direction I'd like my questioning in my trial to 
g o -
THE COURT: And you -
MR. PETTY: - and the questioning that I personally would like 
asked, the line of questioning in order to draw out the evidence that I 
would like drawn out. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you this. Have you been to 
law school? 
MR. PETTY: No, sir. 
THE COURT: You've not attended law school. 
MR. PETTY: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Have you received - received any legal 
training? 
MR. PETTY: No, sir. 
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THE COURT: Have you studied law in any manner? 
MR. PETTY: Not formally, no sir. 
THE COURT: Have you studied law informally? 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. I have. 
THE COURT: And what has that consisted of? 
MR. PETTY: Um, lots of reading of law books and the rules, 
urn, of trial; lots of the evidence area rules of what can be brought 
forth, what can't be brought forth. Um, specifically, in my case as a 
parolee, I was on parole. I'm no longer on parole. But I studied my 
rights, I guess I would say, as someone who was on parole by the 
State of Utah. And those are issues that are going to be in my trial, 
so the background that I did before as the case even came up -
(Inaudible) - with the relevant study I've done on it. 
THE COURT: All right. Are you familiar with the UTAH RULES 
OF EVIDENCE? 
MR. PETTY: Some. That's why I would like Mz. Morgan to 
stay with me as my backup or whatever. 
MZ. MORGAN: Standby. 
MR. PETTY: Standby. If, ah, if, in our preparatory manner, 
whatever we get ready to do, she can tell me if I can or can't do that 
before the trial. 
THE COURT: All right. And are you familiar with the UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE? 
MR. PETTY: No, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Well, Mr. Petty, it would be the Court's 
opinion in this matter that, ah, you're doing yourself a disservice by 
attempting to represent yourself. Ms. Morgan has graduated from 
college four years and then after that she went to three years of law 
school. How many hears of college have you had? 
MR. PETTY: Three-and-a-half. 
THE COURT: All right. Well she's- she has three-and-a-half 
more than you do and three years have concentrated on the study of 
law, where I'm sure yours that you had has not concentrated on the 
study of law. 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: So you're entitled to represent yourself, if you 
wish, but I just caution you that you're going to be going up against a 
prosecutor who's been to law school and, ah, it's his duty to see that 
justice is done. 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And he's going to prosecute this and attempt to 
S 
prove you guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: So you would be doing yourself a disservice, in 
this Court's opinion, by trying to represent yourself, even though you 
have Mz. Morgan as backup counsel. Now with that in mind do you 
still want to go ahead and represent yourself? 
MR. PETTY: Yes, sir. I do. 
COURT RULING 
THE COURT: All right. Well the Court's going to allow you to 
represent yourself and the Court will allow Mz. Morgan to remain on 
as backup counsel - or standby counsel. We will set this for Jury 
Trial then to begin on September 27th at 9:00 o'clock a.m. 
[Sic](T. 7/19/2000 at 5-8). 
Judge Anderson later limited the activities of standby counsel significantly, 
describing her appointed role to the jury as follows: 
I - 1 - as an assistance to him and as is routine in such cases, I have 
assigned, ah, the Public Defender to sit with him at counsel table as what 
we call standby counsel. She can answer his questions and help him 
understand the procedures that are being followed in the courtroom, but it 
is not her responsibility to represent him. She is not to represent him. 
She's not to ask questions. She's not to speak for him. She's there as a 
resource to help him. 
(R. 162at11).3 
The trial court's error in permitting Petty to represent himself can be 
appreciated by reference to Utah case law establishing the trial courts' duties to 
insure that when people opt to represent themselves in criminal cases, they waive 
their right to counsel in a knowing and voluntary fashion. 
3
 Compare McKaskle v. Wiggins. 465 U.S. 168,179-81 (1984)(the Court 
indicated that pro se defendants may waive right to self-representation by 
acquiescence; as long as standby counsel do not substantially interfere with the 
defendant's fundamental control of his defense, it is acceptable for them to ask 
questions and make motions and objections in aid of the defendant's position). 
9 
For instance, in State v. Frampton. 737 P.26 183,187-88 (Utah 1987), the 
court explained, 
It has long been settled that the right to assistance of counsel is 
personal in nature and may be waived by a competent accused if the 
waiver is "knowingly and intelligently" made. Such waiver must of course 
be voluntary. It follows therefrom that an accused's decision to defend 
himself is a waiver of the right to assistance of counsel. However, it is the 
trial court's duty to determine if this waiver is a voluntary one which is 
knowingly and competently made. 
In making this determination, the defendant "should be made aware 
of the dangers and disadvantages of, self-representation, so that the record 
will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
eyes open."' Generally, this information can only be elicited after 
penetrating questioning by the trial court. Therefore, a colloquy on the 
record between the court and the accused JS the preferred method of 
ascertaining the validity of a waiver because it insures that defendants 
understand the risks of self-representation. Moreover, it is the most efficient 
means by which appeals may be limited. 
Even absent such a colloquy, however, this Court, will look at any 
evidence in the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the 
risks of proceeding pro se. In this regard, whether a knowing and 
intelligent waiver has been made turns upon the particular fads and 
circumstances surrounding each case. 
Although a defendant's background is relevant to his ability to waive 
his right to counsel, that background is not relevant to show whether a 
sensible, literate, and intelligent defendant possesses the necessary 
information to make a meaningful decision as to waiver of counsel. The fact 
that a defendant is well educated, can read, or has been on trial previously 
is not dispositive as to whether he understood the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of self-representation in a particular 
situation. 
In the absence of a colloquy, the record must somehow otherwise 
show that the defendant understood the seriousness of the charges and 
knew the possible maximum penalty. The record should also show that the 
defendant was aware of the existence of technical rules and that presenting 
a defense is not just a matter of telling one's story. 
M. at 187-88 (footnotes omitted). 
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The suggested plea colloquy set forth in footnote 12 of Frampton is as 
follows: 
An accused has a constitutional right to represent himself if he 
chooses to do so. A defendant's waiver of counsel must, however, be 
knowing and voluntary. This means that you must make clear on the 
record that the defendant is fully aware of the hazards that he faces and the 
disadvantages of self-representation. 
When a defendant states that he wishes to represent himself, you 
should therefore ask questions similar to the following: 
(a) Have you ever studied law? 
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or any other defendant in a 
criminal action? 
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are charged with these crimes: 
(Here state the crimes with which the defendant is charged.) 
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of the crime 
charged in Count I, the court could sentence you to as much as 
years in prison and fine you as much as $ ? (Then ask him a similar 
question with respect to each other crime with which he may be charged in 
the indictment or information.) 
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of more than 
one of those crimes this court can order that the sentences be served 
consecutively, that is, one after another? 
(f) You realize, do you not, that if you represent yourself, you are on 
your own? I cannot tell you how you should try your case or even advise 
you as to how to try your case. 
(g) Are you familiar with the . . . . Rules of Evidence? 
(h) You realize, do you not, that the Rules of Evidence govern 
what evidence may or may not be introduced at trial and, in representing 
yourself, you must abide by those rules? 
(i) Are you familiar with the Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
(j) You realize, do you not, that those rules govern the way in which a 
criminal action is tried in . . . . court? 
(k) You realize, do you not, that if you decide to take the witness 
stand, you must present your testimony by asking questions of yourself? 
You cannot just take the stand and tell your story. You must proceed 
question by question through your testimony. 
(I) (Then say to the defendant something to this effect): I must advise 
you that in my opinion you would be far better defended by a trained lawyer 
than you can be by yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent 
11 
yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court 
procedure. You are not familiar with the Rules of Evidence. I would 
strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself. 
(m) Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are found 
guilty and in light of all the difficulties of representing yourself, is it 
still your desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be 
represented by a lawyer? 
(n) Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part? 
(o) If the answers to the two preceding questions are in the 
affirmative, you should then say something to the following effect: "I find 
that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel. I will therefore permit him to represent himself." 
(p) You should consider the appointment of standby counsel to 
assist the defendant and to replace him if the court should determine during 
trial that the defendant can no longer be permitted to represent himself. 
Frampton at 177 n. 12 (citation omitted). 
Frampton was cited recently in a case reversed for inadequate proof of a 
knowing waiver of counsel, State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911 (Utah 1998). In 
Heaton. the court described the duties of trial courts as follows: 
The right to have the assistance of counsel in a criminal trial is a 
fundamental constitutional right which must be jealously protected by the 
trial court. The United States Supreme Court has stated: 
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by counsel 
invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in which the accused-
whose life or liberty is at stake- is without counsel. This protecting 
duty imposes the serious and weighty responsibility upon the trial 
judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and competent 
waiver by the accused. 
Because of the importance of the right to counsel and the heavy burden 
placed upon the trial court to protect this right, there is a presumption 
against waiver, and doubts concerning waiver must be resolved in the 
defendant's favor. 
When a trial court is confronted with a defendant who either refuses 
to proceed to trial with appointed counsel or insists on proceeding pro se, 
the court must carefully consider the defendant's right to self-
representation with his right to counsel. Nevertheless, before the court may 
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permit the defendant to proceed without the assistance of counsel, the 
court must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its duty of 
insuring that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily made. 
In making this determination, the court must advise the defendant of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation "so that the record 
will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
eyes open.*" In addition, the trial court should (1) advise the defendant of 
his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, as well as his 
constitutional right to represent himself; (2) ascertain that the defendant 
possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the 
consequences of the decision to represent himself, including the 
expectation that the defendant will comply with technical rules and the 
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's 
story; and (3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of the 
charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any 
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case. 
Heaton at 917-918 (citations omitted). 
As this Court has repeatedly informed the trial courts, the focus of the inquiry 
is not to be on the "irrelevant" issue of legal training, but is to be on "whether the 
defendant understands the traditional benefits of representation by counsel that 
he or she is giving up by choosing self representation." State v. McDonald. 922 
P.2d 776, 783 (Utah App. 1996). 
In the instant matter, the trial court repeatedly focused on the legal training 
Petty did not have, and compared it to the legal training appointed counsel and 
the prosecutor had. BuJ s_§g, e ^ , McDonald. The trial court did not ask whether 
or find that Petty's waiver was voluntary. He did not discuss the charge or 
potential penalty Petty faced. He did not inform Petty that he would be required to 
follow the rules of evidence and rules of criminal procedure, despite his lack of 
13 
familiarity with the rules. The court did not inform Petty that the court would not 
assist Petty in defending himself, and did not explain the procedural impact of 
self-representation on his own testimony. The court did not discuss Petty's 
constitutional right to be represented, or point out the dangers of self-
representation in any specific way. £f. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 919 (The court's 
cursory recommendation to Heaton to rely on defense counsel did not apprise 
Heaton in any way of the constitutional significance of the right to counsel and the 
consequences of waiver While the court's advice [to permit counsel to cross-
examine the witnesses] was certainly appropriate, it addressed only one of the 
disadvantages of self-representation-i.e., not having experience and expertise in 
cross-examining witnesses. Moreover, the trial court had already determined that 
Heaton had decided to represent himself. As we have previously mentioned, 
before a trial court may permit a defendant to proceed pro se, the court must 
determine whether the defendant competently waived counsel at the time of 
waiver, not after."). 
The trial court did not inquire about Petty's experience representing himself 
in, or even experiencing or witnessing a criminal trial. When Petty explained that 
his contemplation of his rights as a parolee provided the necessary knowledge to 
conduct his defense in this case, that in itself should have informed the trial court 
that Petty did not have an understanding of the value of trained counsel to defend 
him in a felony trial. Cf. Heaton. 
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The trial court's errors in permitting Petty to represent himself are not 
ameliorated by the appointment of standby counsel, because the trial court so 
limited her service to Petty. £f. McDonald at 785 (Therefore, although defendant 
was not specifically told the court would not assist him during the trial, the court 
appointed Mr. Albright as standby counsel and made it clear to defendant that Mr. 
Albright would assist defendant during the trial whenever defendant asked."). 
The trial court's error in permitting Petty to represent himself absent proof of 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel requires a new trial. See, 
&&, Heaton, supra. 
JL 
The Absence of an Accurate Elements Instruction 
Requires a New Trial. 
It is axiomatic that the prosecution must prove mens rea for each element of 
any offense charged, unless the offense involves strict liability. Sfifi && State v. 
Elton. 680 P.2d 727, 728-29 (Utah 1984). 
Because the gun possession statute does not indicate by its language that it 
creates a strict liability offense,4 and does not specify a mens rea, proof of an 
intentional or knowing or perhaps reckless mental state will satisfy the statute. 
4Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a)(i) (1999)("A person may not 
purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun described in this part who: has been 
convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the United States, this state, or 
any other state;)" vyjtb Elton at 729 (statute reading "*A person commits unlawful 
sexual intercourse if that person has sexual intercourse with a person, not that 
person's spouse, who is under sixteen years of age.'" did not "even impliedly 
indicate a legislative purpose to impose strict liability."). 
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This is confirmed by reference to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102, which 
provides, 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable 
mental state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a 
culpable mental state and the offense does not involve strict liability, 
intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal 
responsibility. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute 
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose 
criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the 
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
§ge_ aJ§o_ Elton. 680 P.2d at 727 and n.3 (discussing limited circumstances in 
which strict liability offenses may be found); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101.6 
This absence of an accurate elements instruction requires reversal of the 
conviction under basic Utah law. £§g, &&, State v. Jones. 823 P.2d 1069,1061 
(Utah 1991). In Jones, the court reversed an aggravated kidnaping conviction for 
the absence of an elements instruction on that offense, stating, 
The law in this state is that an information instruction is not a substitute 
for an elements instruction. In State v. Roberts. 711 P.2d 236 (Utah 
1985), we stated, The general rule is that an accurate instruction upon 
the basic elements of an offense is essential. Failure to so instruct 
constitutes reversible error." ig!. at 239 (Utah 1985) (citing Laine. 618 
5This statute provides, 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is 
prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal 
negligence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute 
defining the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to the 
violations set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided 
by law. 
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P.2d at 35). £es also. State v. Harmon. 712 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah 1986) 
(per curiam); State v. Reedv. 681 P.2d 1251,1252 (Utah 1984)."). 
Thus, the failure to give this instruction can never be harmless error. 
Jones at 1061. 
In the instant matter, the elements instruction omitted all mention of mens 
rea, stating 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove each 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those elements 
are as follows: 
1. That on or about August 17,1999; 
2. Defendant had been convicted of a felony; and 
3. Possessed or transferred a handgun. 
If you believe that the state has proved each of these elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant guilty. If the 
state has failed to prove any one of those elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
(R. 109). 
While the jurors were instructed in a separate instruction that the State had 
the burden to prove that Petty acted knowingly or intentionally (R. 112),e neither 
6
 Instruction 6 read, 
The state must show that defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. 
A person acts intentionally if he has a conscious objective or desire to act 
or to cause a result. A person acts knowingly when he is aware of his 
conduct, aware of the circumstances, or aware of the likely results of his 
conduct. 
Intent or knowledge are states of mind not usually proved by direct 
evidence. You may infer intent or knowledge from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances. 
(R. 112). 
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the elements instruction (R. 109) nor the information instruction7 required the 
jurors to adjudicate this basic element of the offense.8 
While the absence of an accurate elements instruction constitutes a 
structural error which cannot be considered harmless, e_4k, Jones, supra, it 
appears that the error may have been harmful in this case, in which the jurors 
may well have acquitted Petty if they had been properly instructed on the mens 
rea element, given Petty's testimony that he did not know he was acting 
unlawfully, when he signed his own name and put his own thumb print on the 
pawn ticket ( e ^ R. 162 at 113-14). 
Because Petty did not raise this issue in the trial court, he asserts the plain 
error and exceptional circumstances doctrines on appeal. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful 
error occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the 
7
 Instruction 1 read, 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
The defendant, Clay Hamilton Petty, is accused by the Grand County 
Attorney of committing the following crime: 
Felon in Possession of Handgun, in violation of section 76-10-503, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that said defendant, on 
or about August 17,1999, at Grand County, State of Utah, a person 
who has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this State, or any other state did possess or transfer a 
handgun. 
(R. 107). 
s
 The relevant jury instructions are included in Addendum 2 to this 
brief. 
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obviousness prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which 
is more obvious in hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. S_ge_, e ^ , 
State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), ceiL denied. 493 U.S. 814 
(1989). 
Utah courts recognize that the absence of an accurate elements instruction 
constitutes plain error. S_ge_ Jones: Laine. supra. 
Courts will also reach issues raised for the first time on appeal when there 
are exceptional circumstances, such as serious procedural defects, which require 
the courts to act to prevent manifest injustices. S_§g, e ^ , State v. Gibbons. 740 
P.2d 1309,1311 (Utah 1987) (incomplete trial procedures and change of 
appellate counsel constituted exceptional circumstances); State v. Jameson. 800 
P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990)(serious procedural defects may constitute exceptional 
circumstances). 
The procedural history of this case is exceptional in that the trial court 
permitted Petty to represent himself without insuring that his waiver of counsel 
was knowing and voluntary, appointed standby counsel, and then expressly 
forbade counsel from representing Petty or speaking for him (R. 162 at 11), when 
the law places no such limitations on the role of standby counsel. See, e.g.. 
McKaskle v. Wiggins. 465 U.S. 168,179-81 (1984)(the Court indicated that as 
long as standby counsel do not substantially interfere with the defendant's 
fundamental control of his defense, it is acceptable for them to ask questions and 
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make motions and objections in aid of the defendant). 
In the exceptional circumstances of this case, the Court should order a new 
trial. See, e ^ , Jameson, supra. 
UL 
The Trial Court Should Have Dismissed 
on the Basis of 
The Unconstitutionality of the Gun Possession Statute. 
Awkwardly and repeatedly, Mr. Petty, acting pro se, objected to the overall 
prosecution, asserting his constitutional right to possess the handgun (R. 162 at 
131-32,141). The trial court pointed out Petty's ignorance and eventually denied 
him relief (R. 162 at 132, 141-42).9 
The statute underlying Petty's conviction, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 
(1999), states, 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
The statute purports to penalize mere possession of weapons regardless of 
the purpose of the possession, and does not purport to proscribe the use of 
weapons. This violates the plain language of Article I section 6 of the Utah 
9
 Petty's arguments and the trial court's ruling are in Addendum 3 to 
this brief. 
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Constitution, which provides, 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as 
well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing 
herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of 
arms. 
This state constitutional provision provides greater protection for the 
individual right to keep and bear arms than is provided by most state 
constitutions. Sgg Addendum 4 to this brief, containing several other state 
constitutional provisions. 
Article I section 6 was amended by the legislature and the people of Utah 
to provide greater protection than was provided by the previous state 
constitutional provision, which provided, 
The people have the right to bear arms for their security and 
defense, but the Legislature may regulate the exercise of this right by 
law.10 
The comparative strength of the amended language, and the legislative 
history demonstrate that the legislature and the people of Utah intended to 
provide great protection for the right to keep and bear arms. The language of the 
amendment was passed by a strong majority of the Utah legislature after years of 
study, revision and negotiation. See "The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An 
10
 In State v. Viacil. 645 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982), decided prior to the 
state constitutional amendment, Justices Howe and Stewart noted that the 
constitutionality of the gun possession statute was open to question. Id. at 683. 
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Illusory Public Pacifier?",'* 1986 Utah L.Rev. 751, 753-54 nn. 12 and 13.11 
The Utah Constitution expressly provides that its terms are to be construed 
literally. Article I section 26 of the Utah Constitution provides, "All provisions of 
this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are 
declared to be otherwise." 
Allegiance and adherence to the plain language of the Utah Constitution is 
further required by the State Constitution's express requirement of separation of 
governmental powers. Article V section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided 
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions 
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein 
expressly directed or permitted. 
The relationship between the separation of powers doctrine and 
adherence to the plain language of the law is explained in § 46.03 of Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, as follows: 
The preference for literalism in determining the effect of a statute is 
based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The 
courts owe fidelity to the will of the legislature. What a legislature says 
in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative 
intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the 
expressed intent of the legislature. The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
has captured this idea in the following language: "It is an elementary 
proposition that courts only determine by construction the scope and 
intent of the law when the law Itself is ambiguous or doubtful. If a law 
11
 This article and the legislative history preceding the amendment are 
in Addendum 5 to this brief. 
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is plain and within the legislative power, it declares itself and nothing is 
left for interpretation. It is as binding upon the court as upon every 
citizen. To allow a court, in such a case, to say that the law must mean 
something different from the common import of its language, because 
the court may think that its penalties are unwise or harsh would make 
the judicial superior to the legislative branch of the government, and 
practically invest it with the lawmaking power. The remedy for a harsh 
law is not in interpretation but in amendment or repeal." 
(citation omitted). 
Basic tenets of federalism call on this Court to recognize and enforce the 
plain language of the state constitution. The United States of America is a 
federation of state governments. The states preceded the federation and hold 
general, residual powers to govern, which are limited only by the state and federal 
constitutions. In contrast, the federal government's powers are limited to those 
enumerated in the federal constitution. §ge_ &&, Constitution of United States, 
Amendment X. This federalist form of government is based on historical distrust, 
fear and confinement of centralized government, and historical trust and 
empowerment of local government to represent and serve the citizens of each 
state. See e^g. Manning v. Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549, 553^554 (Utah 
1973)(Justices Crockett, Ellett and Henriod in a concurring opinion). Federalist 
reliance on local government andi limitation of centralized government is reflected 
in the differences between state and federal constitutions. State constitutions are 
tailored to the regions they govern; they are detailed and specific; they are 
dynamic. On the other hand, the federal constitution is uniform general and 
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unchanging. Federalism is a concept historically cherished by the people of this 
state. ELg* L.J. Arlington and D. Bitton, The Mormon Experience. 161-184. Our 
state supreme court was perhaps the last state court to accept "incorporation" of 
provisions of the federal Bill of Rights. See, e ^ , Manning v. Sevier County. 517 
P.2d 549, 553 (Utah 1973)(concurring opinion of three justices characterizing 
federal incorporation doctrine as disingenuous, violative of principles of 
federalism, and expressing the view that the first amendment does not apply to 
state actors). Particularly where the federal constitution provides no protection to 
individuals in the context of the right to possess weapons, e^u State v. Vlacil. 645 
P.2d 677,679 (Utah 1982),12 it is appropriate to decide this question of state law 
under the state constitution. 
While Mr. Petty did not specifically raise a state constitutional argument, this 
Court should nonetheless decide the case on the merits under the state 
constitution for the reasons stated above.13 
The Utah Supreme Court has made state constitutional law on the basis of 
12
 The federal constitutional provision is interpreted narrowly as 
providing a collective federal right relating to militias, and as providing no 
protection for individuals. Vlacil. 
13
 In State v. Archambeau. 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991), this Court 
refused to address the merits of a similar argument, finding that there was no 
plain error. This case is distinguishable from Archambeau because Mr. 
Archambeau was represented by counsel at trial, who did not raise the issue. 
In the instant matter, Mr. Petty was acting pro se, and brought the matter to 
the trial court's attention, to the best of his abilities. 
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arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See, ejk, State v. Larocco. 794 
P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)(interpreting Article I § 14 of the Utah Constitution); State v. 
DeMille. 756 P.2d 81 (Utah 1988)(interpreting Article I § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution). 
Given the plain language of the state constitutional provision, this Court 
should strike the gun possession statute under the plain error doctrine. £§e_, e.g.. 
State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), £§jl denied. 493 U.S. 814 
(1989)(plain error doctrine permits appellate Courts to correct plain and prejudicial 
errors). 
Assuming arguendo that the error should not have been plain to the trial 
court, this Court can surely see in hindsight that the error is definitely prejudicial to 
Mr. Petty, who should not be imprisoned on the basis of the unconstitutional 
statute. See id, (recognizing that errors which are plain in hindsight may still be 
corrected on appeal if they are sufficiently prejudicial). 
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the 
plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138,1140 
(10th Cir.). cert, denied. 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999). 
Courts will also reach issues raised for the first time on appeal when there 
are exceptional circumstances, such as serious procedural defects, which require 
the courts to act to prevent manifest injustices. £ejg, g ^ , State v. Gibbons. 740 
P.2d 1309,1311 (Utah 1987) (incomplete trial procedures and change of 
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appellate counsel constituted exceptional circumstances); State v. Jameson. 800 
P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990)(serious procedural defects may constitute exceptional 
circumstances). 
Here again, the unique procedural history of this case, wherein the trial court 
permitted Petty to represent himself without insuring that his waiver of the right to 
counsel was knowing and voluntary, appointed standby counsel, and then 
restricted his access to her assistance, calls for appellate intervention. When trial 
courts permit people to represent themselves, they should not chide them for their 
legal ignorance and limit the service of standby counsel. See e ^ , McKaskle. 
supra. 
Rather, they should "support, obey and defend" the Utah Constitution, as 
they are sworn to do as members of the Utah State Bar. See Preamble to the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (quoting the oath). 
Given the exceptional circumstances of this case, this Court should rule on 
the merits that the gun possession statute violates Article I § 6 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse Petty's conviction, and order the case dismissed, 
or at a minimum order a new trial. 
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DATED this ' 17 day of. MAV .,2001. 
HAPPTMORGAN 
Counsel for Mr. Petty 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be served two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, this I"7 day of M^7 2001. 
HAPPY MORGAN 
Counsel for Mr. Petty 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered/mailed, first class postage pre-paid, two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this (1 day of MA-/ 
2001. 
27 
Addendum I 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Criminal No. 0017-159 
m
 ' 8 2000 
Held in the Courtroom of said Court, at Moab, Grand 
County, State of Utah, on November 8, 2000, present the Honorable 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Against: CLAY HAMILTON PETTY, 
DOB: 09/29/68 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON 
William L. Benge for Plaintiff 
Happy Morgan for Defendant 
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing 
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court 
and represented by counsel, Happy Morgan, and defendant having 
heretofore been found guilty by a jury of the offense of: 
FELON IN POSSESSION OF HANDGUN, a Third Degree Felony, 
and the defendant stating to the Court that there is no legal 
reason to advance why judgment should not be pronounced, the 
Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of the law as 
follows, to-wit: That you, CLAY HAMILTON PETTY, be imprisoned in 
the UTAH STATE PRISON for a term NOT TO EXCEED FIVE (5) YEARS. 
1 
You, CLAY HAMILTON PETTY, are hereby REMANDED to the 
custody of the Sheriff or other proper officer of the Grand 
County Jail for transfer to the custody of the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this $fly day of November, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
A\>—-% 
\JA&QY>> 
WiJj^ Ljuam "fa-r Bftnge \ 
Grand County A t t o r n e y 
V 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 
2000, I hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the above to Happy Morgan, Attorney for 
Defendant, 8 South 100 East, Moab, Utah 84532; Department of 
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, 1165 S. Hwy. 191, St. 3, 
Moab, Utah 84532; Grand County Sheriff, 125 E. Center, Moab, 
Utah 84532. ^ J ^ ^ W , / ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
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Addendum II 
I 
In The Seventh Judicial District Court Of Grand County 
State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAY HAMILTON PETTY, 
Defendant. 
VERDICT 
Case No. 9917-159 
We, the Jurors in the above case, find the defendant: 
Guilty of Felon in Possession of Handgun 
DATED this 2~f day of S £ P ( € r M f f i 3 \ ,
 A D . 5 2000. 
Q^j^71 ** L i ^ — Foreman 
Clerk 
l t . U D Arv fsrc f tn /h*s3&j£s 
Addendum III 
INSTRUCTION NO, 1 
SEVEHTH D?STR?CT COURT 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
The defendant, Clay Hamilton Petty, is accused by the 
Grand County Attorney of committing the following crime (1 
Felon in Possession of Handgun, in violation of section 
76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that 
said defendant, on or about August 17, 1999, at Grand 
County, State of Utah, a person who has been convicted of 
any felony offense under the laws of the United States, 
this State, or any other state did possess or transfer a 
handgun. 
1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
In order to obtain a conviction, the state must prove 
each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Those 
elements are as follows: 
1. That on or about August 17, 1999; 
2. Defendant had been convicted of a felony; and 
3. Possessed or transferred a handgun^ 
If you believe that the state has proved each of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant 
guilty. If the state has failed to prove any one of those elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. V£> 
The state must show that defendant acted intentionally or 
nowingly. A person acts intentionally if he has a conscious 
bjective or desire to act or to cause a result. A person acts 
nowingly when he is aware of his conduct, aware of the 
ircumstances, or aware of the likely results of his conduct. 
Intent or knowledge are states of mind not usually proved 
{ direct evidence. You may infer intent or knowledge from acts, 
induct, statements and circumstances. 
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instructions up. They should be ready about now. I have to 
review those with them and then make any changes that are 
agreed upon with their comments and then get copies made for 
everyone. So I would suggest that if we're going to be 
practical about this, it's probably going to be 2:00 o'clock 
before I can have those ready to read to you. That's a 
half-hour from now. 
So I'm going to excuse you for the next half-hour. 
During this time period don't discuss the case with anyone. 
Don't allow anyone to discuss it in your presence. Don't make 
up your mind as to any issue until it's finally submitted to 
you for decision. Please be back here at 2:00 o'clock. By 
3:00 o'clock you should—or sooner, you should be starting 
your deliberations. Okay? 
All right. Mr. Petty, Mr. Benge, I'll have the 
clerk bring those up to you just as soon as they're ready. 
And as soon as you've had a chance to review, tell the clerk 
and I'll come in here and discuss any concerns with you. 
(Jury left courtroom.) 
MR. PETTY: Your Honor, I have something I'd like to 
discuss. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED OUTSIDE PRESENCE OF JURY 
MR. PETTY: Your Honor, I'd like to state for the 
record that it is my federal constitutional right to own and 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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possess a firearm by--(Inaudible). Urn, whether the State 
supersedes that or has its stipulations regarding that, I'd 
like the record to show that I am voicing that. 
THE COURT: Under the 4th Amendment? 
MR. PETTY: Well, no. One that says I can have a 
right to bear arms. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PETTY: I know that I'm allowed to by a document 
signed by Thomas Jefferson, yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Thomas Jefferson? 
MR. PETTY: Yeah. He was involved in writin1 it or 
something. I don't know. I don't know my facts on the thing. 
I just know that I'm allowed to own and right—I have the 
right to bear arms. I know it's in the Constitution, whether 
the State of Utah agrees with it or not. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well you need to go back and take 
a history class, maybe a law class or two. Urn, you got 
several facts wrong. 
MR. PETTY: Okay. 
THE COURT: And all you've done is — 
MR. PETTY: As long as the record shows that I am 
voicing that the Constitution shows that I may have a right to 
bear arms, that's what I—(Inaudible). 
1 particular point with Mr. Petty and I am fairly comfortable 
2 telling the Court that there is no Utah case on point. 
3 THE COURT: Nor any U.S. Supreme Court case on 
4 point, as far as you know; right? 
5 MR. BENGE: As far as I know, there isn't, Your 
6 Honor. I'll send it. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. That—that request is denied. 
8 I l m n o t sure it's even timely enough to justify consideration 
9 raised at the end of the trial without any authority, without 
10 any analysis, just the bare citing of the constitutional 
11 provision. But for what it's worth, you've said what you've 
12 said and I deny your request for dismissal. 
13 I'll have these changes made, get copies for 
14 everybody, and be back up here. 
15 (Recess) 
16 PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED WITH JURY PRESENT 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Let's bring the jury in. 
18 (Bailiff summonsed jury from outside the courtroom.) 
19 Seven out of eight isn't bad, but we can't go ahead 
20 without eight. 
21 I've done extensive studies on how long it takes to 
22 I get the jury instructions ready and the only thing I've found 
23 is that it always takes 15 minutes longer than you think it 
24 will take. It doesn't matter how much you try to plan, 
25 Murphy's Law applies to this and it applies in a way that 
J. M. LIDDELL 
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THE COURT: So you donft get that one. 
MR. PETTY: Okay. Urn, and then one more thing. Ifd 
like to renew my objection and ask for relief. The reason I 
objected before was cause I feel I have a constitutional right 
to bear an arm—(Inaudible)—and I'd like the Court to dismiss 
the case because the Constitution says so. Federally I can. 
THE COURT: Do you have any authority for that 
proposition? 
MR. PETTY: To ask for a dismissal? 
THE COURT: Um-hm. 
MR. PETTY: As counsel for myself, as a citizen of 
the United States under the bearing of the Constitution I feel 
I have authority. 
THE COURT: That's it? 
MR. PETTY: I don't know. 
THE COURT: A case? 
MR. PETTY: Is there a list that I can— 
THE COURT: A case? 
MR. PETTY: I don't have a case number at this time, 
no. 
THE COURT: Do you know the text of the 
constitutional provision you're referring to? 
MR. PETTY: Nope. 
M 7 K/irMDr>7\'K7 . 7V ^ J \ r T-I - - -
Addendum V 
Alabama, Article I, section 26 
That every citizen has a right to bear arms 
in defense of himself and the state. 
Alaska, Article I, section 19 
A well-regulated militia being necessary to 
the security of a free state, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed. 
Arizona, Article 2, section 26 
The right of the individual citizen to bear 
arms in defense of himself or the State shall not 
be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be 
construed as authorizing individuals or 
corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an 
armed body of men. 
Arkansas, Article 2, §5 
The citizens of this State shall have the 
right to keep and bear arms for their common 
defense. 
Colorado, Article II, section 13 
The right of no person to keep and bear arms 
in defense of his home, person and property, or 
in aid of the civil power when thereto legally 
summoned, shall be called in question; but 
nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
justify the practice of carrying concealed 
weapons. 
Connecticut, Article I, section 15 
Every citizen has a right to bear arms in 
defense of himself and the state. 
Florida, Article I, section 8 
(a) The right of the people to keep and bear 
arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful 
authority of the state shall not be infringed, 
except that the manner of bearing arms may be 
regulated by law. 
(b) There shall be a mandatory period of 
three days, excluding weekends and legal 
holidays, between the purchase and delivery at 
retail of any handgun. For the purposes of this 
section, "purchase" means the transfer of money 
or other valuable consideration to the retailer, 
and "Handgun" means a firearm capable of being 
carried and used by one hand, such as a pistol or 
revolver. Holders of a concealed weapon permit 
as prescribed in Florida law shall not be subject 
to the provisions of this paragraph. 
(c) The legislature shall enact legislation 
implementing subsection (b) of this section, 
effective no later than December 31, 1991, which 
shall provide that anyone violating the 
provisions of subsection (b) shall be guilty of a 
felony. 
(d) This restriction shall not apply to a 
trade in of another handgun. 
Georgia, Article I, section 1, Paragraph VIII 
The right of the people to keep and bear 
arms shall not be infringed, but the General 
Assembly shall have the power to prescribe the 
manner in which arms may be borne. 
Hawaii, Article I, section 17 
A well regulated militia being necessary to 
the security of a free state, the right of the 
people to keep and ear arms shall not be 
infringed. 
Idaho, Article I, section 11 
The people have the right to keep and bear 
arms, which right shall not be abridged; but this 
provision shall not prevent the passage of laws 
to govern the carrying of weapons concealed on 
the person nor prevent passage of legislation 
providing minimum sentences for crimes committed 
while in possession of a firearm, nor prevent the 
passage of legislation providing penalties for 
the possession of firearms by a convicted felon, 
nor prevent the passage of any legislation 
punishing the use of a firearm. No law shall 
impose licensure, registration or special 
taxation on the ownership or possession of 
firearms or ammunition. Nor shall any law permit 
the confiscation of firearms, except those 
actually used in the commission of a felony. 
Illinois, Article 1, section 22 
Subject only to the police power, the right 
of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed. 
Indiana, Article I, section 32 
The people shall have a right to bear arms, 
for the defense of themselves and the State. 
Kansas Bill of Rights, § 4 
The people have the right to bear arms for 
their defense and security; but standing armies, 
in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and 
shall not be tolerated, and the military shall be 
in strict subordination to the civil power. 
Kentucky, Bill <>| Rights, section 1 
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have 
certain inherent an inalienable rights, among 
which may be reckoned: 
The right to bear arms in defense of 
themselves and of the State, subject to the power 
of the General Assembly to enact laws to prevent 
persons from carrying concealed weapons. 
Louisiana, section 11 
The right of each citizen to keep and bear 
arms shall not be abridged, but this provision 
shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit 
the carrying of weapons concealed an the person. 
Maine, Article I, §16 
Every citizen has a right ot keep and bear 
arms for the common defense; and this right shall 
never be questioned. 
Massachusetts, XVII 
The people have a right to keep and to bear 
arms for the common defence. And as, in time of 
peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they 
ought not to be maintained without the consent of 
the Legislature; and the military power shall 
always be held in an exact subordination to the 
Civil authority, and be governed by it. 
Michigan, Article I, section 6 
Every person has a right to keep and bear 
arms for the defense of himself and the state. 
Mississippi Article 3, section 12 
The right of every citizen to keep and bear 
arms in defense of his home, person, or property, 
or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally 
summoned, shall not be called in question, but 
the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying 
concealed weapons. 
Montana, Article II, section 12 
The right of any person to keep or bcjar arms 
in defense of his own home, person, and property, 
or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally 
summoned, shall not be called in question, but 
nothing herein contained shall be held to permit 
the carrying of concealed weapons. 
Nevada Article I, section 11 
1. Every citizen has the right to keep and 
bear arms for security and defense, for lawful 
hunting and recreational use and for other lawful 
purposes. 
2. The military shall be subordinate to the 
civil power; No standing army shall be maintained 
by this State in time of peace, and in time of 
War, no appropriation for a standing army shall 
be for a longer time than two years. 
New Hampshire, Part I, Article 4 1 
All persons have the right to keep and bear 
arms in defense of themselves, their families, 
their property and the state. 
New Mexico, Article II, section 6 
No law shall abridge the right of the 
citizen to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use 
and for other lawful purposes, but nothing herein 
shall be held to permit the carryinq of concealed 
weapons. 
North Carolina, Article I section 30 
A well regulated militia being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; 
and, as standing armies in time of peace are 
dangerous to liberty, they shall not be 
maintained, and the military shall be kept under 
strict subordination to, and governed by, the 
civil power. Nothing herein shall justify the 
practice of carrying concealed weapons, or 
prevent the General Assembly from enacting penal 
statutes against that practice. 
Ohio, Article I, section 4 
The people have the right to bear arms for 
their defense and security; but standing armies, 
in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and 
shall not be kept up; and the military shall be 
in strict subordination to the civil power. 
Oklahoma, Article 2, section 2 6 
The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms 
in defense of his home, person, or property, or 
in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally 
summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing 
herein contained shall prevent the Legislature 
from regulating the carrying of weapons. 
Oregon, Article I, section 27 
The people shall have the right to bear arms 
for the defence of themselves, and the State, but 
the Military shall be kept in strict 
subordination to the civil power. 
Pennsylvania, Article 1, section 21 
The right of the citizens to bear arms in 
defence of themselves and the State shall not be 
questioned. 
Rhode Island, Article I, section 22 
The right of the people to keep and bear 
firms shall not be infringed. 
South Carolina section 20 
A well regulated militia being necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed. And in times of peace, armies are 
dangerous to liberty, they shall not be 
maintained without the consent of the General 
Assembly. The military power of the State shall 
always be held in subordination to the civil 
authority and be governed by it. No soldier 
shall in time of peace be quartered in any house 
without the consent of the owner and in time of 
war but in the manner prescribed by law. 
South Dakota, Article VI, section 24 
The right of the citizens to bear arms in 
defense of themselves and the state shall not be 
denied. 
Tennessee, Article I, section 26 
That the citizens of this State have a right 
to keep and to bear arms for their common 
defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by 
law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view 
to prevent crime 
Texas, Article I, section 23 
Every citizen shall have the right to keep 
and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or 
the State; but the Legislature shall have power, 
by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a 
view to,prevent crime. 
Utah, Article I, section 6 
The individual right of the people to keep 
and bear arms for security and defense of self, 
family, others, property, or the state, as well 
as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the 
legislature from defining the lawful use of arms. 
Vermont, Chapter I, Article 16th 
That the people have a right to bear arms 
for the defence of themselves and the State - and 
as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous 
to liberty, they ought not to be kept up; and 
that the military should be kept under strict 
subordination to and governed by the civil power. 
Washington, Article I, section 24 
The right of the individual citizen to bear 
arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall 
not be impaired, but nothing in this section 
shall be construed as authorizing individuals or 
corporations to organize, maintain or employ an 
armed body of men. 
Wyoming, Article I, section 24 
The right of citizens to bear arms in 
defense of themselves and of the state shall not 
be denied. 
Addendum VI 
HOUSE DEBATE ON 
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 2 
(replaced by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3) 
March 7, 1983 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Dahl. 
REP DAHL: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. 
?: This is Senate Joint Resolution No. 2 that was repealed in favor 
of Senate Joint Resolution 3. 
MR. SPEAKER: Opposed. 
BODY: No. 
MR. SPEAKER: The motion carries. We'll read the bill. 
?: Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, Right to Bear Arms, by Senator 
Jack M. Bangerter. Be it resolved by the Legislature of the State 
of Utah, two-thirds of all members elect . 
This voting in favor thereof. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Dahl. 
REP. DAHL: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. This is a constitutional 
resolution that, if this passes, it will be put HI the ballot a year 
from now for the people to vote on to see if they want to put some 
specific language in the Constitution. And we think that this is 
very, very important that this be done. And just UM me tell you 
some of that reasoning. Utah has a need for a strong constitutional 
guarantee because the second amendment to the U.S. Constitution does 
not protect us against state infringements. And remember that the 
Constitution is a negative charter. The Constitution is a 
instrument in which the people tell government what they can enforce 
and what they cannot enforce. And so we think this is very 
important due to some rulings that have been made. So if, what this 
will do will give us some rights. It will not be limitations. 
There are, out of 39 states which have constitutional right to keep 
arms provisions, only 2 of those put some regulatory 
language in it. One of them is Illinois, which says that this right 
is subject only to police power. And the other one is Utah, that 
says that we have the right but the Legislature may regulate the 
exercise of that right. So this gets very scary to me because in 
Illinois, there has been statutes ranging from license, owner 
licensing, firearm registration, the prohibition against firearms 
outside of a residence, bans on classes of firearms—and they have 
all been repeatedly upheld as a proper form of police power. And 
it's very interesting that virtually this same language has been 
used by the Utah Supreme Court in two recent cases saying that the 
power of the State to deny ownership to a class of people is ruled 
as a proper action consistent with the Utah Constitution. Chief 
Justice Hall has said that the second amendment does not guarantee 
you and I individual, you and I as individuals to keep and bear arms 
but only as a collective right such as the militia. And we think 
that the, this is not consistent with what the people of this state 
believe and not consistent with what it should be. And so for that 
reason, that's another one of the many reasons why we think this 
ought to come before the people to change that constitution. Maybe 
I'll just submit to any questions that you have and proceed from 
- 2 -
there. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Christensen. 
REP. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I don't have any 
questions, but I'd like to give one of my long talks today, if I 
could. 
MR. SPEAKER: We might take back that standing ovation, but you go 
ahead. 
REP. CHRISTENSEN: I'm a loser already, aren't I? I speak in favor 
of this constitutional revision part. It's essential to the people 
of Utah. They have nurtured this right since they came here. It's 
one of the things that they just take for granted. Now we changed 
some of our last year to make it more agreeable with what 
we've already done. And that was good. I'd just like to remind you 
that when the smart people who honored our country, when they made 
the laws and made the regulations, James Madison, I'd going to say 
that he'd be awful nervous if he found us nowadays trying to do the 
things he didn't want done, because he was, as you recall, one of 
those that wrote the Declaration of Independence. And where they 
passed this as one of their laws without even a recorded vote. It 
passed on a years ago. And this is part of 
America. And, of course, they debated other things an awful lot 
longer. But when they passed this one, it was, there was no 
trouble. Everybody agreed with it. It was part of their law. 
Anyway, to keep it short, like I usually do, vote for this. It's 
good. Let's keep it up. Let's keep it, make it part of Utah. 
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MR. SPEAKER: Representative Fullmer. I should add, Representative 
Christensen, we'll still applaud. Representative Maxfield. 
REP. MAXFIELD: Just a question. Are we on the 
MR. SPEAKER: We're on the HSJR 2. 
REP. MAXFIELD: Not the substitute? 
?: No, it's on the golden copy. 
REP. MAXFIELD: Well, there's the goldenrod. 
?: That's not a substitute. It's just 
MR. SPEAKER: The Senate amendment. 
?: The Senate amendment. 
REP. MAXFIELD: That's all I wanted. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Hillyard. 
REP. HILLYARD: I just rise to state my concern with this 
constitutional amendment. Not that I'm against the right to bear 
arms because I think that's an important constitutional right that 
we have. But I voted against SJR 8 for the reason that I did vote 
against Representative Taylor's constitutional amendment. As I 
think that we really need to vote on those things when we're in a 
budget session just before we take action and put them on the 
ballot. And, again, I'm concerned when we vote too early and set 
things on the ballot we may foreclose us of doing other things that 
may be important then. I just also say, a concern I have is that 
I've been a member of the Judiciary Committee since I've been a 
member of this body and interim study. And we've talked about 
having this thing come before an interim study to look at and 
review, and it never has. And I'm a little concerned about doing a 
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bill this significant that affects such a basic constitutional right 
without having at least the interim study look at it. And we have 
no problem with having it done and looking at it during the budget 
session so it can go on the ballot. But I've had at least expressed 
to me, and I've seen some writings of people that I respect in the 
area of criminal law who have some concern that this may limit the 
policeman. And, I know, I've read Senator Hatch's statement, and 
I've read the contrary. I guess like Representative Merrill says, 
there are disagreement among lawyers. But I think it would behoove 
us to not pass this, to look at it during the interim, and look at 
it during the budget session—or, if the Governor, in fact, is going 
to have a special session just for constitution amendments, we can 
then decide which one of those items in that would be 
the most important to consider. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Skousen. 
REP. SKOUSEN: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. In regard to the statements 
made by Representative Hillyard, I think the fact that 39 states 
have made thorough studies of this situation should set our fears at 
rest. These states have found that the courts have interpreted the 
United States Constitution where it says that the citizen's right to 
bear arms shall not be infringed simply means that this is a 
collective statement. It does not apply to the individual; in other 
words, the National Guard may bear arms. But they have interpreted 
that to mean that the private citizen does not have an inalienable 
right to bear arms. Thirty-nine states have come to the conclusion 
that, in order to protect their citizens and their right to bear 
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arms individually, they must have this legislation. So I think the 
interim studies have been carried on to the extent that we need to 
study them. The facts are out. I believe we should vote on them 
now to assure ourselves that some future legislation on the right of 
the private persons to carry, to have guns in his possession at 
home, for example, and not have the law state that, from that time 
on, it is unconstitutional from the State's standpoint. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Walker. 
REP. WALKER: Yes. You know, I certainly support the right to bear 
arms. And when I read this, I talked to several lawyers whose 
opinion I respect, and they had some serious questions about what it 
did, whether we really wanted it as written. And they, there was 
sufficient doubt in my mind whether we shouldn't look at it 
further. Certainly I believe in the right to bear arms for the 
individual. I believe in those rights as the Constitution gives 
them to us. But I would really, since we can't put it on the ballot 
this year, I, for one, would like to have the time to really look at 
it, study it, and come up with some concrete support or objections. 
I'm not certain whether, in the long run, I would support or reject 
this. But I would like the time to thoroughly study it myself so 
that I might know for a certainty whether the questions that were 
brought up by those I talked to were legitimate or not, and I 
certainly respect their legal minds because I was seeking advice 
from those who I felt had, should know. And so, I would urge you to 
wait on this. We have another chance to vote on it. I believe, at 
the present time, I'll vote "no." But maybe a year from now, I'll 
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vote "yes" on exactly the same legislation. But I Do need that time 
to study it. I Do need the time to get answers to my questions, and 
I would urge you to do likewise. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Kromer. 
REP. KROMER: Representatives, I urge support of this bill. I think 
it's very clear the issue. I think all of us have read the 
impressive study done by Senator Hatch on subcommittee on this 
issue, on defining militia as the individual citizen right to bear 
arms. I think we've all looked at history and seen the pitiful 
sight of a Warsaw ghetto where the people didn't have any arms to 
defend themselves and are at the mercy of the government. And I'm 
concerned about the future, that our liberties really lie on the 
right to defend those liberties. And I think we, that's a basic 
right for an individual to bear that arm. It doesn't just mean that 
our security rests in the police force or the National Guard but the 
individual citizens. And that's the way this country's been. And I 
think that's where our freedom's preserved. So I urge support of 
this resolution. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Moreen. 
REP. MOREEN: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I, too, would like to rise 
and support this. I think that we do need to do this. This is a 
basic fundamental right that we've had in this country, and it's 
important to us that live out in the boondocks. Sometimes we feel a 
special need for those. And I just hope that you'll support this 
resolution. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Karas. 
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REP. KARAS: I rise in support of this. I find it interesting that 
we can pass a 177-page banking bill without even reading it—pardon 
me for making that inference—and then take a simple 2-page 
resolution like this that's very clear and say that we need to study 
it more. I think we ought to stand up and be counted and vote for 
it. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Harrison, would the sponsor yield a 
question? 
REP. HARRISON: I'll try. 
MR. SPEAKER: Would this preclude registration of handguns and 
Saturday night specials? 
REP. HARRISON: Well, I hope, hopefully it wouldn't. My authority 
over here tells me "no way." Okay, as he points out, this does not 
specifically address registration. It simply gives us our right to 
bear arms for the specific things that are addressed in here. And 
it doesn't preclude legislation concerning concealed weapons or 
felons or any prohibitive person from being, those rights being 
taken away from them. 
MR. SPEAKER: Would it be permissible for the Legislature, after 
passage of this constitutional amendment, to then require 
registration of Saturday night specials? 
REP. HARRISON: He says, "Yes, if they wanted to." It was permitted. 
MR. SPEAKER: Assuming that the person acquiring the Saturday night 
special was a law-abiding citizen and had not been convicted of a 
prior felony, could the Legislature prevent his acquisition of a 
Saturday night special or any handguns? 
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REP. HARRISON: If they wanted to. 
MR. SPEAKER: Good. Thank you. Representative Richards. 
REP. RICHARDS: Mr. Speaker and fellow representatives, I'd like to 
call your attention to a very important body we have, and that's 
called the Constitution Revision Commission. I've been on that body 
for six years. The Speaker's been there as well. I think one of 
their reasons for that commission is that these things of import 
that would change our constitution comes before us and we get all 
the input that's given to us by private citizens, by organizations, 
by elected officers to bring it to our attention in order that we 
can analyze it and come back to this body with a recommendation. 
This particular resolution has not been before the Constitution 
Revision Commission. We have ample time between now and the 
election of, what, two years from now. We can handle it again with 
a recommendation from your commission. Now if you don't want a 
commission, you want to bypass the commission—and certainly every 
legislator has the right to give us a constitutional amendment— 
don't forget, once you get those in, they're not amendable. It's 
quite a bit different than a statute. If you want to make a change 
later on, then you have to go through the whole process again to 
amend it. It would be my recommendation—I have no fault with the 
intent of the sponsor nor Senator Bangerter who is a very able 
senator—but I think, in this case, they have bypassed the 
Constitution Revision Commission. And I think it ought to be given 
back, defeated on this floor now, with no intent other than to have 
it further studied, and then come out to you as a constitutional 
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recommendation as we did with Proposition 1, 2, 3 and 4, which all 
passed successfully because we gave public information and did all 
that was necessary to make it a good bill. So I would hope that you 
would keep the order in place of having those people who are 
interested in constitutional changes to bring it to the Constitution 
Revision Commission that meets monthly, and, from there, we can 
decide whether the Legislature wants to enact a bill amending the 
Constitution which then is not amendable. Thank you. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Lewis. 
REP. LEWIS: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I'm new to this process, but 
I, too, would take some exception to bypassing or going around the 
Constitution Revision Commission that we have in place. I have some 
concerns about the language that is currently in this resolution. I 
would feel very good about supporting a resolution and sending it to 
the vote of the people to amend our constitution to guarantee this 
right. I do want to see more time and more import from all the 
parties that are interested into this, but I would especially like 
to see the Constitution Revision Commission have some time to look 
at this. And I would like to have something that I can feel very 
good about supporting. There's no need to be in a rush. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Brown. 
REP. BROWN: I move previous question on the bill as stated. 
MR. SPEAKER: The previous question has been called for. All in 
favor say "aye." 
BODY: Aye. 
MR. SPEAKER: Opposed. 
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BODY: 
MR. SPEAKER: The motion carries. You may sum up, Representative 
Dahl. 
REP. DAHL: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I think it's very important 
that we realize that this, they had two committees, the hold over in 
the Senate, it was debated very extensively, the Senate passed it 2 6 
to 2. As far as the Constitution Revision Commission, in all due 
respect to them, they're not a divine body. And next session is a 
budget session, and this is not a budget item. It ought to be taken 
care of now because we don't have time to handle these kinds of 
things in a short budget session. So it ought to be addressed. I 
can't see anyone opposing this unless they want the Legislature to 
proceed to make rules against it. It would not prevent us from 
passing laws for concealed weapons or, as I mentioned before, for 
those people who are prohibitive and shouldn't be having this. 
Unless this Legislature someday hopes to enact statutory, statutes 
that would effectively deprive us of these rights, then there's no 
reason why we shouldn't support this. And I guess I would just ask 
for your support. I think it's a very good bill. 
MR. SPEAKER: The voting is open. It appears to the Chair that all 
present have voted. The voting is closed on SJR 2. And having 
received 61 affirmative, 9 negative votes, passes this House, has 
been signed by the Speaker, will be returned for the signature of 
the President. 
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Addendum VII 
SENATE DEBATE ON 
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 3 
March 28, 1984 
?: . . . the top of second reading calendar, and I so move. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Okay. It's been moved that we move SJR3 to the top 
of the second reading calendar. All in favor indicate by saying 
"aye." 
BODY: Aye. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Are there any opposed? So ordered. Yes, Senator 
Bangerter. 
SEN. BANGERTER: Thank you, Mr. President. This is, SJR3 is a 
constitutional amendment on the individual right to keep and bear 
arms. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Excuse me just a moment. It needs to be read in. 
SEN. BANGERTER: Oh, I make a motion that SJR No. 3 be read in. 
SECRETARY: Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, the right to bear arms 
amendment, by Senator Bangerter. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Now go ahead, Senator. 
SEN. BANGERTER: Now it's before us. Thank you, Mr. President. As 
you remember, in 1983, we passed an SJR No. 2. It was the 
individual right to keep and bear arms to put before the voters in 
November. It had some anxiety with law enforcement people, and we 
have spent many, many hours together trying to resolve the problem. 
At this particular point, you have before you the new language in 
SJR3, and I'm sure that you have read it several times . . . 
Legislature to control the use thereof of guns. If there are any 
questions, I would submit to those questions. You have, 
Mr. President, a question on the bill. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Okay, and would you like to make that motion? 
SEN. BANGERTER: Yes. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Oh, yes, we have a question. Yes. 
SEN. SWAN: I was still turning to Senator Bangerter. Could you 
explain very briefly what the change is that's been made from our 
previous action. 
SEN. BANGERTER: We have an amendment in on the previous action that 
would confiscate and spell out those things the Legislature could 
and should do. It, they were taken out and basically affixed to 
therein as the basic concept that you asked for last time, Senator 
Swan, that we leave those things up to the Legislature and let them 
allow the use of arms. So basically, that's all there is to it. 
It's self-explanatory. All the peace officers and everyone has 
agreed to that, Senator Swan. 
SEN. SWAN: The peace officers feel that, by changing the language 
and not spelling out the things that you mentioned, there's less 
chance that something will slip through the cracks and that some 
loophole in law enforcement might be found. 
SEN. BANGERTER: I might explain that the peace officers are 
thrilled with this particular bill because it allows the Legislature 
that prerogative of placing in statute rather than the constitution 
the use thereof. 
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SEN. SWAN: I'm going to vote for the bill, Senator, but I think 
the, we have to be reminded of the fact that most of us are not that 
convinced that we've had any problem with the present constitutional 
language. I think it's more a threat to the future and a worry, and 
maybe I'm divulging the fact that I'm not a member of NRA. But 
sometimes the staff and an organization have to have issues, and I 
think that this is certainly a very jazzy issue for a national 
organization to work with. And I'm not at all thrilled with some of 
their past performances. I remember a concealed weapons bill, and 
Representative Strong in the House was nailed publicly for that, and 
it was, I thought it was completely inappropriate. So I don't have 
the greatest love for some of the past performance of some of their 
staff. 
SEN. BANGERTER: Sen. Swan, you're entitled to vote "no" and I 
understand your concern. Basically, that's what it is. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Okay. Senator Black. 
SEN. BLACK: Yes. I think we ought to now support this. I think we 
had some problems with law enforcement really in opposition to what 
they had, for Bangerter and people from NRA and law enforcement in 
getting together and working out the problems that they felt that 
they had. I do know that they did reach agreement, that the 
national NRA has endorsed the concept of what we have here. And I 
think that a bill that might have put an amendment on the ballot 
that would probably, because of the adverse opposition it would have 
received had it gotten there in its previous form. These problems 
have been addressed, and I believe that we now have something we can 
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put to the voters that we can feel good about and support. And I 
would urge your support for this piece of legislation. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you. Any other comment? Seeing none, would 
you like to make that motion? 
SEN. BANGERTER: Mr. President. Under suspension of the rules, I 
would make a motion that we pass from Senate SJR No. 3 from the 
second to the third reading calendar up for final passage to the 
House. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Thank you. The motion is that, under suspension of 
the rules, that Senate Joint Resolution be considered be correct for 
the second and third time and up for final passage. All in favor 
indicate by saying "aye." 
BODY: Aye. 
MR. PRESIDENT: Are there any opposed? So ordered. If you'd please 
call the roll. 
?: Asse—Aye, Bangerter—Aye, Barlow—Aye, Barton— , Black—Aye, 
Bullon—Pass, B —Aye, Carling—Aye, Christensen— , 
Cornabee—Aye, Finlansen—Aye, Flann—Aye, Matheson—Aye, 
McAllister—Aye. Thank you. McMullin—Aye, Monne—Aye, 
Overson—Aye, Sherry (?) Peterson—Aye, Lowell Peterson—Aye, 
Pugh—Aye. Thank you. Rogers—Aye. Thank you. Sandberg— , 
Snow—Aye, Sowards—Aye, Stratford— . Thank you. I just can't 
hear. Swan—Aye, Waymot—Aye, Williams—No. Thank you. Senator 
Barton. 
SEN. BARTON: Thank you. Mr. President. Thank you. Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 3, having received 26 aye votes, 1 nay vote, and 2 
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being absent, has received a two-thirds majority and has passed this 
House and will be referred to the House for its, for further action. 
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Addendum VIII 
HOUSE DEBATE ON 
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 3 
March 29, 1984 
MR. SPEAKER: - Representative Dahl. 
REP. DAHL: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. This is the right to bear arms 
amendment that we passed last session to go on the ballot. I think 
most of you received letters. There was the peace officers, and 
Public Safety had some problems with that. Our attorneys and the 
National Rifle Association and everybody felt comfortable with it, 
but we didn't want to get in a conflict with them. We've sit down 
and had several meetings to come up with some compromise. There's 
some other things we'd like to have on this, but at this late date, 
and we are under a compromise, so the material you have in front of 
you is a compromise position. They are supporting this. It sets 
out to do what we initially set out to do last year. The Senate 
attacked an amendment on there last year which caused the 
controversy. But what we have accomplished here is that the 
Legislature may not take our right away to bear arms for the 
protection of ourself, family and property. And so, I guess, I'll 
just be open for any questions. I would like, I guess, to encourage 
no amendments at this point so that we don't have to go back to the 
Senate for this and we can—I would like to let you know that those 
individuals that worked with us have give me their word that they'll 
help us, whoever next year, to sponsor some legislation that will, 
in fact, do the things that you see on the amendment that's on your 
desk that we're not going to propose. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Christensen. 
REP. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Ladies and Gentlemen of 
the House, gun possession in the southern part of the State is just 
a way of life. We do it all the time. It's just part of growing 
up. But the concept of gun control in Utah has been here before. 
Now you judge how effective it was. My information tells me that 
the Honorable H. Jay Richards presented a bill prohibiting the sale 
of this type of pistol. It was the first measure that year that was 
produced from the body that became law, being the very first one to 
go to the governor to receive his signature. The sale of this 
dangerous article, which was then prohibited, said he 
expressed his pleasure at such a law being enacted. Now the bill 
passed both houses, almost without an attempt of dissent, the only 
objection coming from one member who expressed himself to the effect 
that he considered the subject to be too trifling for a regulative 
action. The local paper editorialized saying, "We are gratified 
that this bill for the prohibition of the sale of the little 
implement of evil has passed and become law." This happened 100 
years ago in March of 1884 and dealt with the embargo of toy 
pistols. Mr. Speaker, I support this amendment, this bill. 
MR. SPEAKER: It doesn't mean I have to get rid of my water pistol, 
does it? Representative Fullmer. 
REP. FULLMER: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. As Representative Dahl says, 
this is a compromise and I appreciate all the parties who have 
agreed upon this amendment. There have been a lot of things said 
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good, bad or indifferent about things that have happened. I think 
that this is a good compromise and it embodies the two things that I 
was concerned about in that the Legislature can still speak on the 
matter and there are a number of issues that must be addressed. I 
pledged, and I follow that pledge, that the grievances by the Utah 
Sport Shooting Council as far as Divisional Wildlife Resources is 
concerned that I would sponsor a bill to insure due process, and I 
will do that. We even have the bill ready, but the Governor did not 
want any more things on the call. And I think that we could handle 
that problem. Wildlife Resources even signed off on it. So I ask 
your support in this bill and that we can pass it and get it on the 
ballot. 
MR. SPEAKER: Representative Walker. 
REP. WALKER: I move the previous question. 
MR. SPEAKER: The previous questions been called for. All in favor 
say "aye." 
BODY: Aye. 
MR. SPEAKER: Opposed. 
BODY: 
MR. SPEAKER: The motion carries. Do you wish to sum up? 
?: No, I waive summation, thank you. 
MR. SPEAKER: The voting is open. It appears to the Chair that all 
present have voted. Voting is closed. I'll send it Joint 
Resolution 3, and having received 62 affirmative and 1 negative 
votes, passes this House, has been signed by the Speaker. We return 
for the signature of the President of the Senate. Turn to Joint 
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Resolution 5. Don't interrupt me while I'm announcing a vote. 
Having received 66 affirmative and 2 negative votes, passes this 
House—Let's see, did we amend that here? It's moved back to the 
Senate for their consideration of our amendment. 
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Addendum IX 
Constitutional Revision Commission 
May 25-26, 198* 
Page 2 
Mr. Tew indicated that the amendments would appear on the November 198* 
ballot as follows: 
Proposition 1 - Tangible Personal Property Tax Exemption 
Proposition 2 - Legislative Sessions 
Proposition 3 - Judicial Article Revision 
Proposition * - State School Fund Amendments 
Proposition 5 - Right to Bear Arms 
Mr. Tew reviewed the commission's involvement with 198* education effort on 
the constitutional amendments. He noted that the commission's involvement would 
be similar to its role in 1982. Commission discussion ensued on the commission's 
position concerning each of the proposals. Particular concern centered on 
Propositions * and 5 which were not the subject of commission study. 
MOTION: Sen. Black moved, seconded by Mr. LeFevre, that the commission 
endorse Propositions 1, 2, and 3 ard take a neutral position concerning Propositions 
* and 5. 
Further commission discussion ensued. Discussion centered on the role of the 
commission in pproviding information to the public. 
SUB. MOTION: Dr. Hickman moved, seconded by Sen. Sowards, that the 
commission not endorse any proposals, and provide educational material on all of the 
amendments. The material could note which items were the subject of commission 
study. 
Dr. Hickman suggested that informing people only what items were studied by 
the commission would convey a tacit stamp of approval without getting into an 
actual endorsement. Sen. Sowards suggested that the same idea—that of 
commission approval of certain of the amendments—would be conveyed by the fact 
that commission members are writing on Propositions 1, 2, and 3 for the Voter 
Information Pamphlet. Justice Howe felt that this plan was too cautions. He noted 
that the commission had spend considerable study time on Propositions 1, 2, and 3, 
and should formally recommend their passage. 
The substitute motion failed with Chairman Snow, Dr. Hickman, and Sen. 
Sowards voting in the affirmative, Mr. Fordham, Justice Howe, Mr. LeFevre, Mr. 
Mayne, Sen. Black, Rep. Richards, and Dr. Southwick voting in opposition, and Mr. 
Fowler, Speaker Bangerter, Mr. Hixson, Mr. Leavitt, and Mr. Memmott absent. 
The main motion passed with Chairman Snow, Dr. Hickman, Justice Howe, Mr. 
LeFevre, Sen. Black, Rep. Richards, and Dr. Southwick voting in the affirmative, 
Mr. Fordham, Mr. Mayne, and Sen. Sowards voting in opposition, and Mr. Fowler, 
Speaker Bangerter, Mr. Hixson, Mr. Leavitt, and Mr. Memmott absent. 
MOTION: Dr. Soutnwick moved, seconded by Rep. Richards, that the 
commission take no position on Propositions * and 5, and indicate this position was 
taken because the commission had not considered these proposals. The motion 
passed unanimously with all members marked present voting. Mr. Fowler, Speaker 
Bangerter, Mr. Hixson, Mr. Leavitt, and Mr. Memmott were absent. 
Addendum X 
Utah Voter 
Information 
Pamphlet 
General Election 
November 6,1984 
vOMPILED BY DAVID S. MONSON, LT. GOVERNOR 
IN COOPERATION WITH THE UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE 
MILES 'CAF FERRY, SENATE PRESIDENT 
NORMAN H. BANGERTER, HOUSE SPEAKER 
ANALYSIS BY JON M. MEMMOTT, DIRECTOR, OFTICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
For O 
Against Q 
Proposition 
No. 5 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 
AMENDMENT 
Official Ballot Title: 
Shall Article I, Section 6, of the State 
Constitution be amended to state that the 
individual right to keep and bear arms for 
the security and defense of the individual, 
family, others, property, or for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed, but the 
Legislature may define the lawful use of 
arms. 
Vote cast by the members of the 1984 Legislature on final passage: 
HOUSE (75 members). Yeas, 63, Nays, I, Absent or not voting, 11 
SENATE (29 members) Yeas, 26, Nays, 1, Absent or not voting, 2. 
IMPARTIAL ANALYSIS 
Proposal 
The Utah Constitution in Article 1, Section 6 guarantees the 
people the nght to bear arms for their security and defense. This 
section also gives the legislature the authority to regulate the 
exercise of this right by law The Utah Supreme Court has 
interpreted this section to indicate that it gives to the legislature 
the authority to forbid possession of dangerous weapons by those 
who are not citizens, who have been convicted of crimes, who are 
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent (State 0. 
Bearchia 530 P. 2d 813 1974) 
The proposedlimendment defines the nght to bear arms 
further by adding language which specifies the right as an 
individual nght of the people to keep as well as bear arms. The 
revision lists the things for which keeping and beanng arms for 
security and defense may be used. These include: (1) self, (2) 
family, (3) others, (4) property, or (5) the state, and other lawful 
purposes. 
The proposed amendment deletes the provision that allows 
the legislature to regulate the exercise of the right in hear inns 
and instead gives the legislature the right to define i lie lavslu! i»s" 
of arms. 
The changesin this prop«»s»i|M\i nm vmuldnot llh-d im-l 
the current Utah laws which for bid tin possession of dangi i MIS 
weapons to criminals, drug addicts oi men(all\ iwompetnif 
persons and other illegal use of arms now defined in statute 
However, further legislation concerning Ihe right to keep and hear 
arms would be limited to defining tin lawlul use of aims 
Effective Date 
The amn'«drnent, if approved bv the \oters, would be effective 
beginning January 1, 1985 
Fiscal Effect 
The proposed revision of Aiticle I, Section b will not have 
any significant fiscal impact 
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Arguments for 
Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution is to be 
amended to read as follows: 
The individual right of the people to keep and bear 
arms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein 
shall prevent the legislature from defining the 
lawful use of arms. 
The amendment specifically guarantees broad individual 
liberties and protects the enjoyment of those liberties from 
infringement. At the same time, the legislature may continue 
to enact laws against the misuse of arms and the police may 
continue to enforce such laws; enforcement would extend to 
seizing arms which are misused. 
An individual right to keep and bear arms is guaranteed. 
However, convicted felons, mental incompetents, minors, 
and illegal aliens would not be guaranteed this right. The 
principle of law that such persons may be excluded from the 
enjoyment of the right to keep and bear arms is well-
established. 
Constit ut ionally protected arms include rifles, shotguns, 
pistols and revolvers, and hunting knives. The term "arms" 
docs not extend to every conceivable weapon or instrument. 
Thus, weapons not commonly kept by people, such as switch-
blade knives or instruments of mass destruction, for example, 
rockets or bombs, find no protection under this guarantee. 
The right to keep constitutionally protected arms 
includes the right to purchase arms and ammunition and to 
keep arms in a state of repair. 
The object or end to be attained by this right is to 
guarantee that arms may be kept or borne for defensive 
purposes. The right is not restricted just to the specified 
purposes. Other lawful purposes are also included. Thus, 
traditional purposes such as lawful hunting and lawful 
recreation use would also be protected. 
While the hearing of arms for a constitutionally 
protected purpose extends to open carrying, the bearing of 
arms concealed may be regulated by, for example, requiring a 
license to carry arms concealed. However, r i n s ing would 
have to be equitably administered. Futhermore, che open 
carrying of arms may be prohibited in places such as 
i Mirtrooms, polling places, or at a public assembly. 
The right to keep or bear arms for a constitutionally 
pm • •• •! piirpuse may not be infringed. Thus, for example, 
laws bai.:.;.:•" :he possession or sale of constitutionally 
protected anus, laws requiring a license to acquire or possess 
such arms, requiring the registration of such arms, or 
imposing special taxation on such arms would be impermis-
sible. 
The legislature retains the authority to define the lawful I 
use of arms so as to protect the people for the misuse of arms. I 
The types of misconduct that the legislature may forbid by I 
defining the lawful use of arms are well-known and self- I 
evident. Examples of such misconduct include using arms to I 
commit robbery, carrying are while intoxicated, using arms I 
to harass, intimidate, or recklessly endanger someone, I 
shooting in an unsafe place or manner, and poaching. I 
Vote "FOR" Proposition 5! I 
Senator Jack M. Bangerter I 
1177 East 500 North I 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 1 
Representative Donna M. Dahl 1 
2440 East 6200 South I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 1 
Rebuttal to I 
Arguments in favor of Proposition No. 5 I 
The argument is very ill-considered. It fails to take into I 
account the basic fact that the subject is very thoughtfully I 
dealt with in the constitution as it now reads. I 
The statement lists classes of persons who are said not I 
to be assured rights under the provision. But that is not I 
provided in the proposed amendment itself. I 
The statement undertakes to identify protected arms. It I 
is so broad as to include Saturday-night specials. It speaks in I 
unequivocal terms which amount to constitutional guaranties. I 
The fundamental infirmity of the statement is its J 
declaration that the end to be attained by the "right" is to J 
assure that arms may be kept for. defensive purposes. I 
Obviously it is not so confined. I 
The statement declares that, if adopted the provision I 
would preclude legislation requiring licenses to acquire or I 
possess arms "for a constitutionally protected purpose" and I 
would preclude laws requiring registration. Nothing could be 1 
more opposed to the public interest Firearms are intrinsically J 
dangerous and as such should be registered just as, of course, I 
are motor vehicles. We know, in the case of the latter, that 1 
registration is vitally important to law enforcement and I 
protection of public safety. With the aid of registration J 
responsible persons will be encouraged to exercise the J 
requisite care, criminal activity may be prevented and 1 
persons engaged in crime may be apprehended. This applies J 
as well to firearms. 1 
Mr. Jefferson B. Fordham 
Distinguished Professor of Law 
College of Law 
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Arguments Against Rebuttal to 
The proposed Utah constitutional amendment as to 
firearms should not be approved by the voters. The present 
constitutional provision is quite well-considered. It recognizes 
a right to bear arms and, at the same time, empowers the 
legislature to regulate the subject. Nothing could be more 
evident than that organized society should be competent to 
protect the public safety against the unregulated availability 
of deadly weapons. 
As the Supreme Court of the United States has made 
quite clear, the provisions of the Second Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States concerning a right to bear 
arms relate to the availability of arms for citizen militia. 
It would be no less than foolhardy to deny the 
representatives of the people adequate authority to protect 
the citizenry generally against the misuse of deadly weapons. 
Certainly it should be clear that all of us in organized 
society have vital dependence upon our elected representa-
tives to adopt reasonable measures to assure the public 
safety. 
Vote "AGAINST" Proposition 5 as an unnecessary and 
unwise change in the Utah constitution! 
Mr. Jefferson B. Fordham 
Distinguished Professor of Law 
College of Law 
University of Utah 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112 
Arguments against Proposition No. 5 
Currently, Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution 
not only grants a right, but allows the legislature to restrict 
the right. This leaves the provision upen lo a great deal of 
interpretation. Subsequently, in one recent Utah Supreme 
Court case dealing with this issue, the five justices wrote 
three different opinions as to what rights the citizens of Utah 
have and the extent those rights can be regulated. One of 
those opinions state that regulation to the point of complete 
prohibition is a proper exercise of legislative authority under 
Utah's current constitutional provision! 
Therefore, Proposition 5 seeks to change the last clause 
of the current language from a grant of legislative authority to 
regulate the right to a recognition of the legislative power to 
define the lawful use of arms. It's a change that will not 
compromise the ability of the legislature to draft laws 
necessary to protect the populace from firearms misuse. 
The amendment also acknowledges the right belongs to 
the individuals in society rather than the people as a whole 
and adds the right of keeping arms to the already recognized 
right to bear arms, in addition, Proposition 5 clarifies the 
reasons for keeping and bearing arms to include not only 
security and defense, but other lawful purposes such as 
hunting and target shooting. 
Proposition 5 is needed to provide this and future 
generations of Utah citizens with a strong, positive guarantee 
of their individual right to keep and bear arms. 
VOTE "FOR" Proposition 5! 
Senator Jack M. Bangerter 
1177 East 500 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Representative Donna M. Dahl 
2440 East 6200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
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COMPLETE TEXT OF PROPOSITION NO. 5 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS AMENDMENT 
A JOINT RESOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATURE PROPOSING TO 
AMEND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION; RELATING TO THE 
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS; SUBSTITUTING THIS RESOLUTION 
FOR A RESOLUTION PASSED AT THE GENERAL SESSION 
OFTHE 45th LEGISLATURE; AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE 
DATE. 
THIS RESOLUTION PROPOSES TO AMEND ARTICLE I, SEC 6, OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, AND REPEALS AND WITHDRAWS 
ENROLLED COPY SJ.R. NO. 2 PASSED BY THE GENERAL 
SESSION OF THE 45TH LEGISLATURE AND REPLACES IT 
WITH THIS RESOLUTION. 
Be It resolved bv the Legislature of the State of Utah, two thirds of 
all members elected to each of the two houses voting in favor 
theroT 
Section 1 It is proposed to amend Article I, Sec. 6, of the 
Utah Constitution, to read: 
Sec, 6. The individual right of the people (have the rtght) 
to k_eep and bear arms for (thetr ] security and defense (; btrt 
trie Legislature ftttty regui&te tne exercise ©f this right uy raw j 
of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for 
other Uwful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing 
herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful 
use of arms. 
Section 2. Enrolled Copy S J R. No. 2 passed by the General 
Session of the 45th Legislature of the state of Utah is 
repealed and withdrawn in its entirety from the next general 
election. 
Section 3, The lieutenant governor is directed to submit in 
lieu thereof this proposed amendment to the electors of the 
state of Utah at the next general eleotion in the manner 
provided by law. 
Section 4. If approved by the electors of the state the 
amendment proposed by this joint resolution shall take 
effect January lf 1985. 
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Addendum XI 
The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusory 
Public Pacifier? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1982 the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the second 
amendment to the United States Constitution1 as providing a "col-
lective"' rather than an ',individua^', right to bear arms.4 Relying 
on one of the few United States Supreme Court decisions inter-
preting the second amendment/ the Utah court justified a state 
statute* that prohibited aliens from possessing firearms as a valid 
exercise of state police power.7 By concluding that the second 
amendment provides a collective right to bear arms, the court 
opened the door for a similar interpretation of article I section 6 of 
1. "A well regulated Militia, being neceeaary to the security of a free Sute , the right of 
the people to keep and bear A m i , ehall not be infringed." VS. CONST, amend. II. 
2. The "collective** view eaeentiaJly interpret* the right to bear arme ae the right of a 
•Ute to maintain a militia, or aa the right to prevent the impairment of a aUte'a active 
militia. Dowlut, The Right to Arms' Does the Constitution or the Predilection of Judges 
Reignt, 36 OKLA. L. RIV. 65, 67-68 (1983); §ee infra notee 21-22 and accompanying text. 
3. The term "individual*' ia uaed in thin Comment to mean that the right to bear arm* 
guaranteea the individual the right to keep and bear a/roe to perform militia dutiea, to deter 
governmental oppression, to maintein public order and for aelf-defenae. Dowlut, supra note 
2, at 67. 
4. Sute v. Vlacil, 646 P.2d 677, 679 (Utah 1982). 
6. United S u U i v. Miller. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
6. UTAH Cons ANN. f 76-J 0-603{J) (J978) providea in part; 
Any person who is not a citizen of the United States . . . ehall not own or have in hie 
poaaession or under his custody or control any dangeroua weapon aa defined in this 
part. Any person who violates this aection is guilty of a claaa A misdemeanor, and if 
the dangerous weapon ia a firearm or sawed-off shotgun he shall be guilty of a felony 
of the third degree. 
7. Vlacil. 646 P.2d st 679-80. The court reasoned that the "Second Amendment right 
is not absolute" and that "an individual's right to bear arms is subject to the police power" 
of the statea. Id (citing Hardiaon v. State, 84 Nev. 125, 129, 437 P.2d 868, 871 (1968)). 
Moreover, Utah precedent had eatebliahed that prohibiting aliens from poaaeeeing firearms 
was a proper exercise of police power by the state. See Su te v. Beorehia, 630 P.2d 813, 814-
16 (Utah 1974). The court affirmed the finding in Beorehia that "the Legislature had suffi* 
cient power*' under the Utah Constitution "to enact the statute in question." Vlacil, 646 
P.2d at 680 (citing Beorehia, 630 P.2d at 814). Deapiu the defendant's contention that the 
Utah Constitution gives the legislature the right to "regulate" but not "prohibit" the poaeee-
sion of firearms by any class, the court concluded that the atatute safeguards the public 
peace and aecurity because the legislature determined that the "poaaeaaion of firearms by 
sliens wn« harmful." V/aci/, 645 P.2d at 680. 
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the Utah Constitution, which at that time read, "The people have 
the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but the Legis-
lature may regulate the exercise of this right by law/* 
On November 6, 1984, Utah voters attempted to close the door 
to a possible collective right interpretation of the Utah constitu-
tional right to bear arms by voting to amend article I section 6. 
The amendment states, "The individual right of the people to keep 
and bear arms for security and defense of^elf, family, others, prop-
erty, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be 
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the Legislature from 
defining the lawful use of arms."* 
The National Rifle Association ("NRA"), the motivating force 
behind the amendment, argues that the amendment prohibits 
"laws banning the possession or sale of constitutionally protected 
arms, laws requiring a license to possess such arms, requiring the 
registration of such arms, or imposing special taxation on such 
arms."9 At a minimum, the NRA argues that the Utah amendment 
guarantees the right to every law abiding citizen to possess and to 
bear constitutionally protected weapons in nonthreatening 
situations.1* 
8. An examination of the language and circumstance* surrounding paaaage of the 
right to bear arma amendment indicate* that an individual right waa intended. The right 
waa formerly given to the "people" and now it given to the "individual." Proponent* of the 
amendment claimed that the new amendment certifies that "|a)n individual right to keep 
and bea/ arma ia guaranteed." Utah Voter Information Pamphlet 28 (1984). Proponent* 
further argued that the amendment "specifically guarantee broad individual liberties and 
protect* the enjoyment of thoee liberties from infringement." Id. The National Rifle Associ* 
ation ("NRA") waa concerned primarily with the word "regulate" in the former amendment 
Utah WCJ the only state that granted the legislature the power to "regulate" arms. Propo-
nent* of the amendment argued thai this word eventually could lead to a complete arms 
prohibition. Dowlut, Utah's New Guarantee to Keep and Bear Arms: Development and 
Analysis 6 (unpublished msnuBcript, copy on file with aufhor) (Mr. Dowlut in General Coun-
sel for the NRA). 
The NRA also believes that the amendment waa neceiuiary to make the Utah Constitu-
tion conform with what the NRA claims is an individual right to bear arma under the sec-
ond arosndment of the United States Constitution. Telephone interview with Dave Warner, 
NRA spokesperson, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 25, 1986); telephone interview with George 
Myfeler, NRA field representative, Colorado Springs. Colorado (Mar. 26. 1986) |hereinafter 
ciLed as Myfeler interview]. The NRA relies heavily on a Senate Subcommittee report to 
support its view that the second amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms. 
See STAFF or SENAT* COMM. ON TMI JUDICIARY. SUBCOMM. ON THR CONST.. 97th CONG, 2O 
Sase, THR RIOHT TO K K V AND BBAR ARMS (Comm. Print 1982). 
9. Dowlut, supra note 8, at 16. 
10. Although NRA representative* seem to disagree, it appears that the constitutional 
limit, in their opinion, hingee more on how a weapon is used than on where or when it is 
uaed. For eiample, George Myfeler, NRA field represents tive for aeveral Western states, 
sees nothing wrong with a person carrying a rifle through a public ahopping mall, as long as 
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On the other hand, some opponents of the amendment argued 
that the amendment was a waste of taxpayers* time and money 
because it did not change anything.11 Others claimed that the 
amendment would give "every vigilante group free reign in justify-
ing open use of modern weapons."11 
The scope and implications of the new individual right to bear 
arms are unclear. What is the scope of an individual's expressly 
guaranteed right to bear arms for "security and defense"? What 
are the other "lawful purposes" for which an individual's right to 
bear arms are immune from state infringement? Finally, to what 
extent may the legislature regulate arms under the new amend-
ment? The text and legislative history of the amendment provide 
little guidance on these questions.11 Consequently, the Utah courts 
the carrier doss not threaten anyone with i t Recently, however, a Colorado off-duty police-
man shot his wife's attorney in a courtroom. The NRA did not oppose a subsequent ordi-
nance banning all weapons from courtrooms. Myfeler interview, supra note 8. 
11. Salt Lake Tribune, Oct. 10, 1984, at A16, col. 1. The Tribune editorial claimed 
that "Proposition 6 |the right to bear arma amendment) is a total waste of public time end 
money. No showing has ever established the slightest need for this change. Utah has gotten 
along fine with it* existing acknowledgment of a person s right to bear arms for reasonable 
purposes." Id The editorial claimed that "|t)he hated word 'regulate* may be missing, but 
the legislature would lose none of it* powers to prevent the perilous building of personal 
arsenals. The right to bear arma in Uuh would be no more absolute than it b now." Id. 
12. Sslt Lake City television station KSL. editorial comment (Oct 22, 1984). KSL 
claimed that 
Proposition Five would considerably broaden the wording of the constitution and 
would cloud the issue of the right to bear arms . . . . It Ukes away the power to 
regulate and gives lawmakers only the power to define lawful use of arms. 
The dangers of such freewheeling language are obvious. It would give every vigi-
lante group free reign in justifying open use of modem weapons. And it would deny 
the elected representatives of the people the power to control such dangerous 
activities. 
Id. 
Despite media opposition, the amendment always had strong public support See, e.g., 
Webb, We're About Euenly Split on Proposed Cable Law. Deseret News, Aug. 12, 1984, at 
Al, col. M (indicating overwhelming public support of the amendment). Eventually, 370,566 
voters favored the amendment, and 231,413 voted against it. Dowlut, supra note 8, at 1. 
13. There is no official legislative history on the amendment s^ it passed the legisla-
ture in it* final form. The 1984 amendment passed through the legialature with only two 
dissenting votes. There was no debate in either the House or Senate on the amendment 
The lack of official history could lead one to believe that the Amendment paaaed with-
out controversy. That waa not the esse. Behind the scenes work to amend the constitution 
began in 1982. Senator Jack Bangerter first proposed that the amendment read as followi: 
"The individual right of the people to keep and bear arma for defense of themselves, their 
fsmilies. their property, and the State, rnd for lawful hunting, recreational uae and all other 
lawful purposes, •hall not be infringed/' Dowlut, supra not* 8. st 6; interview with Alan 
Csrver, Legislstive Chairmen of the Uuh Stats Rifle and Pistol Ase'n, Chairman of ths 
Uuh Shooting Sporu. in Salt Lake City, Utah (Apr. 1, 1986) (hereinafter cited as Carver 
interview). 
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and the legislature are faced with the task of giving content to a 
constitutional right that is void of Utah precedent and legislative 
history. This Comment will address this dilemma by examining the 
history of the right to bear arms under federal law, and more im-
portantly, by examining other state laws that provide an individual 
in a memorandum circulated throughout the legialaturj* Professor Ronald N Boyce 
claimed that the Bangerter amendment would "put the legislature in a atraightjacket and 
make the legislature unable to respond to unforeseen needs to control the persons who can 
keep arms ' Memorandum to William R Hyde from Ronald N Boyce I (Ian 18, 1983) 
(copy on hie with author) Profeesor Boyce believed the amendment was "dangerously un 
wise " He claimed it could * significantly undermine law enforcement and threaten aocieiy, 
not preserve it " Id 
Senator Fred Pmlinaon successfully moved to amend the original proposal with the fol lowing clause 
(B)ut this provision ahall not prevent the passage of laws to govern the carrying of 
concealed weapons, nor prevent passage of legislation providing penalties for the po« 
session of hreBrms by convicted felons, minors, mental incompetent* or illegal aliens, 
nor shall any law permit the confiscation of hrearmt, except thoae used in the com* 
mission of a felony 
Dowlut, supra note 8, at 6, UTAH SENATE JOURNAL 460 (Feb II, 1983) In this form, the 
amendment passed the Senate by a 26 2 vote, then passed the House by a 61 9 vote 
Dowlut, supra note 8, at 6 (citing House Clean Amendments on Right to Rear Arms, t/ni* 
form Car Tax, Salt Lake Tribune, Mar 8, 1983, at A4, col 1, Legislative Calender, Deseret 
News. Mar 8 9, 1983, at Al, A2, col 1 
The NRA recognizes a tactical error in introducing the amendment in the 1963 legisla 
live session because Utah voters could not vote on it until fall of 1984 Carver interview, 
supra In the ensuing year, much debate aurfaced over the language o( the amendment See, 
eg Armn Hill Sponsors to Explain Proposal, Deseret News, Apr 3, 1981, al Hll , col 1, 
Speak Out The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Deaeret News, June 6, 1981, at A21, col 1, 
Lau\er Ex Polueman Agree, But Not on Gun Amendment, Salt Lake Tribune, Dec 2, 
1981, at Hfl col |, Parker, Gun Amendment Needs Retneut, Advuer* Report, Salt Lake 
Tribune Mar 1\ 1984, at Bl, col 6, Pusey, Critics and Proponents Air \ tew* on Amend 
mrnt Hills Deseret News. Mar 23, 1984, at Bl6, col 1, Bates, Debate Flares Over Arms 
Amendment Salt Lake Tribune, Mar 24, 1984, at Bl , col 1 
Because of the possible problems with the amendment, Governor Scot I M Matheson 
recalled the amendment before the 1984 legislature Of particular concern was the question 
whether police olhcers could "seize" weapons in dangerous circumstances The Finlinaon 
amendment prohibiting ' confiscation" was viewed as possibly prohibiting seizure Carver 
interview, supra, 
Therefore, to clarify thia issue, the amendment was streamlined to ite final version The 
final language was settled on in a meeting between Senator Bangerter, Representative 
Donna Dnhl law enforcement representatives, and Alan Carver of the Utah Shooting SporU 
Council Id 
Mr Carver argues that the intent of the words, "but nothing herein shall prevent the 
legislature from defining the lawful use of arms,' was not meant to limit the preceding 
clause 1 he right to bear arms, Carver claims, is alwolute in defense of self family, others, 
property, the state, and for * other lawful purposes" The last phraae was adopted only to 
allow the legislature to define ' other lawful purposes," not to emasculate any right guaran* 
teed by the preceding phrase Mr Carver claims that legislative history of the clause's pur* 
po*e may have l>een purposely kept out of the official record to allow such »n emasculation 
Id 
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right to hear arms.14 
11 THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS UNDER THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
Utah's n^ht to bear arms amendment was fueled by debate in 
recent years over an individual's right to possess firearms.1* The 
debate has centered largely on whether the second amendment to 
the United States Constitution guarantees a collective or an indi-
vidual right to bear arms.1* An individual right generally refers to 
one's right to bear arms to perform militia duties, to deter govern-
mental oppression, to maintain public order, and to protect one's 
self.17 This view is endorsed by a minority of legal scholars" but is 
espoused by a majority of the populace that generally opposes the 
idea of controlling guns.1* The collective view essentially limits the 
right to bear arms to the right of a state to maintain a militia.10 
The collective position is supported by a majority of lawyers and 
14 Examining sute law is "more important" than relying on the history of the second 
amendment because the weight of authority interprets the second amendment as providing 
a collective right to hear arms, see infra notes 21-22, and because state constitutions play an 
increasingly important role in judicial review For an excellent discuaaion of this evolution, 
see Linde, E Plunbus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA L. REV 165 (1984). 
15 See, eg, Morganthau. A Goetx Backlashl, NEWSWEEK, Mar 11, 1985, at 50 63, 
Press, A Ven Rough Justice, NEWSWEEK Mar 11, 1985, at 54 See generally Note, Quilict v 
Village of Morton Grove Ammunition for a National Handgun Ban, 32 DEPAUL L. RKV 
371, 371 84 (19H1) (recounting history of the moat renown firearm controversy) In Quilici v 
Village of Morton Grove. 69S F 2d 261 (7th Cir 1982). cert dented, 464 U S 863 (1983), the 
Seventh Circuit upheld a city ordinance that banned both the sale and poeaeaaion of hand* 
guns The Morton Grove decision launched a national debate on an individual's right to 
Hear arms 
16 For a list of articles debating this issue, see infra notes 18, 21 
17 Sec *uprn note 3 
18 Sec, eg, Caplan, Restoring the Balance The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 
FOROMAM URR L J 31, 50 53 (1976), Dowlut, supra note 2, at 100 01, Gardiner. To Preserve 
liberty—A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N Kv L Riv 63, 73 74 (1982), 
Hardy & Stompolv, Of Arms and the Law 61 CHI -KENT L. REV 62, 66-79 (1974), Hays, The 
Riiht to Bear Arms, A Study in Judicial Misinterpretation, 2 WM & MARY L REV 381, 
405 06 (1960). Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment 82 MICH L REV 204, 244 57 (1983), Malcolm, The Right of the People to 
Keep and Bear Arms The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST LQ 285, 305-14 
(1981), Sprecher. The Lost Amendment, 51 A B A J 554, 557 (1965) 
19 In a 1975 national poll asking whether "the right to keep and bear arms applies to 
each individual citizen or only to the National Guard," 70"< of the respondents favored the 
individual right alternative Another 3r« believed the aecond amendment applied to both 
the individual and the National Guard 121 CONG REC 42. 112 (1975) In a 1978 poll that 
asked, "Do vou believe the Constitution of the United States gives you the right to keep and 
bear arm*9," 87"i of the respondenu responded affirmatively DECISION MAKING INFORMA-
TION ATTITUDES or THE AMFRICAN ELECTORATE TOWARD GUN CONTROL (1978) (both polle 
cited in Kates, supra note 18, at 206 07 r 11) 
20 See supra note 2 
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law professors'1 and is endorsed by the American Ba 
Association." 
A. Supreme Court Decisions' 
The second amendment reads, "A well regulated Militia, bein 
necessary to the security of a free Statetj the right of the people t 
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."'1 The United State 
Supreme Court has had but four occasions to interpret the secon< 
amendment.*4 In none of these cases did the Court expressly deter 
mine whether the second amendment provides an individual o 
21 See, eg , Feller L Colling, Tht Second Amendment A Second Look, 61 Nw UI 
FUv 46, 67-70 (1966). Jackson. Handgun Control Constitutional and Critically Needed, 
NC CINTRAL LJ 189. 197 (1977), Levin, The Right to Bear Arms The Development of th 
American Experience, 48 CIII-KKKT L R*V 148. 166 67 (1971). Rohner. The Right to Bea 
Arms A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATM UL Rev 53, 77 80 (1966] 
Weatherop, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens An Historical Analysis of the Secoru 
Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST LQ 961, 1000 01 (1976), Nou. The Right to Keep am 
Bear Arms, 26 DRAKE L. RIV 423. 444 (1977) 
22 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY BOOK (Aug 1975). KsUs, supra not* 18, st 20 
n 14 Even th* American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") denies that the second amend 
ment create* an individual right to bear arms The ACLU established the following po)ic> 
The eetting in which the Second Amendment was proposed and adopted demon* 
•tretes that the right to bear arms is a collective one existing only in the collective 
population of eech state for the purpose of maintaining an effective state mi litis Ths 
ACLU agrees with ths Supreme Court's long standing interpretation of the Second 
Amendment that the individual's right to bear arms applies only to the preservation 
of efficiency of e welJ regulated militia Except for lawful police and military pur-
poses, the possession of weepons by individuals is not constitutionslly protected 
Therefore there is no constitutions! impediment to the regulation of firearms 
ACLU SUMMARY (Juns 14-16, 1980) (ss cited in Kstes. supra note 18. at 207 n 15) 
This Comment will not attempt to settle the collective versus individual right debate 
Whether one believes thst ths second amendment provides en individual right or a collec 
tive right to bear arms, the Utah amendment providing an individual right is, nevertheless 
s valid sxsrcise of the state's authority to adopt a constitution more broad than the fed era. 
constitution If an individual right is provided by the second amendment, the Utah provi 
sion merely confirm* that right for Utah citizens On the other hand, if the second amend 
ment provides a collective right, the weight of authority indicates thst states retain the right 
to regulate arms, which sllows sn individual state guarantee to keep and bear arms See 
Presssr v Illinois. 116 U S 252. 266 (1886) (second amendment only protects individuals 
from being disarmed by ths federal government), United States v Cnukshsnk. 92 U S 542, 
553 (1876) (second amendment shall not be infringed by Congress), Commonwealth v Da-
vis. 369 Mesa 886. 343 N E 2d 847. 860 (1976) (second smsndmsnt inhibits only ths na-
tional govarnmsnt. not Uis state governments), Hsrris v State, 83 Nsv 404, 432 P 2d 929, 
930 (1967) (second amendment appliea only to the federal govarnmsnt snd does not restrict 
stats sction) 
23 U S CONST amend II 
24 United States v Miller, 307 U S 174 (1939), Miller v Tsxss, 163 U S 536 (1894), 
Preaeer v Illinois, 116 U S 252 (1886), United States v Ciuikshank, 92 U S 542 (1876) 
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collective right to bear arms." In 1939 the second amendment re-
ceived its last and most thorough treatment." In United States v. 
Miller the Supreme Court upheld indictments under the National 
Firearms Act for possession of an unregistered sawed-ofT shotgun." 
The defendant argued that the Firearms Act violated his constitu-
tional right to bear arms by prohibiting possession of a sawed-off 
shotgun The Court rejected this argument, stating that second 
amendment protections only apply to those weapons that bear 
"some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a 
well regulated militia."" The Court further implied that the sec-
ond amendment guarantees only a collective right to bear arms by 
stating it exists for the "obvious purpose" of "organizing, arming, 
and disciplining, the Militia."" 
Even though the federal government has a comprehensive fire-
arm regulatory scheme," the Supreme Court has had few occasions 
to interpret the second amendment. Challenges to federal laws in 
lower courts often meet a quick death because there is no showing 
that the laws obstruct "the preservation or efficiency of a well reg-
ulated militia."'1 Thus the generally recognized collective right 
stance taken by the Supreme Court" has precluded federal case 
2r. United Steles v Miller. 307 U S 174. 178 (1939) (upholding the constitutionality 
of sn a<l prohibiting sswed off shotguns because ths second amendment wes msde for the 
' obvious purpoee of "organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia"), Miller v Texas, 
153 U S 515, 538 (1894) (upholding a conviction under a Teias statute prohibiting the car-
rying of a pistol on s public street because the second smendment hss "no reference 
whatever to proceedings in state courts"), Presser v Illinois. 116 U S 252, 265 (1886) (hint-
ing thst the second amendment provides a collective right bv stating that "the States can-
not prohibit the people from keeping end hearing arms, so as to deprive the United 
Steles of their rightful resource for msinlaimng the public security*'). United Stales v 
Cruikfthank, 92 U S 542, 553 (1876) (slating that the second amendment "is one of the 
amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national 
government") 
26 Untied States v Miller. 307 U S 174 (1939) 
27 Id at 175 
2H Id al 178 
2«» Id 
10 SVe eg 26 U S C | f 5801 5862 (1982). 18 U S C | | 921 928 (1982) 
-W United Stale, v Warm. 530 F 2d 103. 106 (6th Cir), cert denied, 426 U S 948 
(1976) United Slates v Johnson. 497 F 2d 548, 550 (4th Cir 1974), Cody v United States, 
460 F 2d 14 37 (8th Cir ), cert dented, 409 U S 1010 (1972). United Stales v Synnes, 438 
F2d 764 772 (8th Cir 1971), vacated on other grounds, 404 U S 1009 (1972), Cases v 
United Ststes, 131 F 2d 916. 922 (1st Cir 1942), United States v Tot, 131 F 2d 261, 266 (3d 
Cir 1<>42) 
12 f-ederal courts hsve relied on Supreme Court holdings to validate the Federal Fire-
arms Act. 15 U S C i | 900 909 (1964) (repealed 1968). and the National Firearms Act. 26 
U S C §§ 58015862 (1982) See United Stales v Adams, 11 F. Supp 216. 219 (S D FIs 
1915) (upholding the Nstionsl Firearms Act and claiming that the second amendment "re-
758 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1986: 751 
law prescribing the scope of an individual right to bear arms. 
Ill THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS UNDER STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS 
One point made clear by the United States Supreme Court is 
that the second amendment is only a limitation on the power of 
the national government and does not restrict the states' ability to 
control arms.** Thus, in the absence of a state constitutional guar-
antee, a state's ability to regulate arms is limited only by the equal 
protection and due process requirements of the United States Con* 
stitution. State authority to regulate arms stems from the state's 
police power,'4 i.e., the power to enact laws protecting the public 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare.9* The sole limitation on 
regulations enacted under a state's police power is the idea of rea-
sonableness: "(B]oth the goals of legislation and the means chosen 
to achieve those goals must be reasonable in light of the public 
welfare."" Legislation is rarely invalidated as unreasonable, how-
ever, because courts generally defer to the legislative determina-
tion of the means needed to protect the public welfare.*7 There-
fore, states without arms guarantees appear free to enact a broad 
range of firearms regulations. 
Thirty-nine states have constitutional provisions that guaran-
tee the right to bear arms.** Seventeen of those provisions contain 
(•n to the militia, a protective force of government, to tht collective body and not individ-
ual right*"). United States v Tot, 28 F Supp 900, 903 (D NJ 1939). rev'd on other 
ground; 319 U S 463 <1943) (upholding the Federal Firearm* Act and also claiming that 
the second amendment provides a collective right only applicable against the federal 
government) 
33 See supra note 25 
34 Note, The Impact of State Constitutional Right to Bear Arms Provisions on State 
Gun Control Legislation. 38 U CHI L. RKV 185, 187 (1970) 
35 Id "(AJIthough the federal government is one of enumerated powers, the stale 
governments generally have plenary authority to act except where restricted by their consti-
tution* " Id at n 13 (citing T M COOLSY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 9 (1871)) 
36 Note, supra note 34. at 188. tee, e g . George v Oren Ltd & Aseocs , 672 P 2d 732. 
737 (Utah 1983) ("I I In the eiercise of its power, a state can enact regulations or laws reason-
ably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort or general welfare of the 
community ") 
37 Note, $upra note 34, at 188 (citing Jacobean v. MaasachuaetU. 197 U S II, 31 
(1905)), see, eg, Baatian v King, 661 P 2d 953 (Utah 1983) "It is the power and responsi-
bility of the Legislature to enact laws to promote the public health, safety, morals and gen-
eral welfare of society, and this Court will not substitute our judgment for that of the Leg is-
lature with reaped to what best serve* the public interest." Id at 956 (citation omitted). 
38 Dowlut. supra note 2, at 102 05 app (citing the state provisions guaranteeing • 
right to bear arms) 
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language that suggests an individual rather than a collective right 
to bear arms." Stated purposes for securing an individual right to 
bear arms, however, differ significantly among state constitutions. 
Illinois simply provides that "the right of the individual citizen to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."40 Utah, on the other 
hand, provides an individual right for "security and defense of self, 
family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful 
purposes.*'41 A few state constitutions prescribe the regulating au-
thority of the legislature. For example, Texas allows the legislature 
"to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime."4* 
Similarly, Utah provides that "nothing . . . shall prevent the legis-
lature from defining the lawful use of arms."4* 
Unlike the second amendment, state right to bear arms provi-
sions are often interpreted and provide insight on the scope of 
Utah's new individual right to bear arms. The formulation of a 
uniform Mtest" by which to determine the validity of regulations in 
states with individual arms provisions would be convenient at this 
point Unlike the "reasonableness" test employed in states without 
arms guarantees, however, a test to apply when an individual right 
exists is not readily available. This problem is a result of different 
stated purposes and regulatory abilities under each state provision. 
Essentially, however, three approaches are available to determine 
the validity of state statutes. First, many statutes can be upheld by 
referring directly to the language of the constitutional provision.44 
Second, the constitutionality of regulations can hinge on a "balanc-
ing of the public benefit to be derived from the regulation against 
the degree to which it frustrates the purposes of the provision."4* 
l<t *wr infra app at pp 77R 79 (listing of slate constitutional provision* guaranteeing 
an individual right lo hear arms) The key phrases indicating that an individual right was 
intended include "every |each| (individual! citizen," "no person" and "individual right" 
40 I I L CONST art I, | 22 
41 UTAH CONST art 1. § 6 
42 I E X CONST art I, S 23 (emphasis added) 
43 UTAH CONST art I. f 6 
44 For example, the constitutions of Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon-
Una and New Meitco specifically disavow a right to carry concealed weapons See infra 
spp at pp 778 79 
46 Note, supra note 34. at 202 03 (citing cases that uphold regulations that do not 
impair the purpose of the aecond amendment to maintain a slate militia) 
1 he hslancing approach suggests a "reasonableness" type test by requiring a weighing 
of the public benefit versus the private harm resulting from the regulation This test may be 
a recognition of the idea that a constitutional guarantee of right* does not place the exercise 
of these rights beyond the police power See State v Rath bone, 110 Mont 225, 100 P 2d 86, 
92 (1940) (questioning the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the killing of game out 
of season and slating that "the operation of the police power is necessarily in moat instances 
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Third, reference to the historical purposes for assuring a right to 
bear arms is helpful to assess the validity of state statutes in light 
of evolving historical reasons for bearing arms. Generally recog-
nized historical purposes for assuring a right to bear arms include 
maintaining a militia,4* deterring governmental oppression,47 and 
•n infringement of private right*, but in the exercise of suit) power, property end individual 
right* may be injured or impaired only to the extent reasonably necessary to preserve the 
public welfare'*). 
.The balancing test also requires analysis of the slated purposes for providing an indi-
vidual right to bear arms. This necessarily requires a determination of whether the stated 
purposes are as strong a reason today to grant an individual right to bear arms as they were 
when the provision was adopted. When no stated purposes are provided, reference to his lor-
ical purposes is helpful. See infra notes 46-48. 
46. The colonial distaste for standing armies led to widespread belief in individual 
possession of weapons. Further, the colonies could not afford to maintain a regular army. 
These factors resultad in a militia consisting of all "able bodied" men. Poaaession and famil-
iarity with firearms was a necessity when the militia was called into action. See Kates, supra 
note 18, at 214-15; Malcolm, $upra note 18, at 290-95; United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 
179 (1939). 
47. Colonists viewed a standing army as facilitating governmental oppreaaion. Stand-
ing armies had been uaed by England to intimidate and control the colonies. Weatherup, 
supra not* 21, at 982-64. In 1774 the Continental Colonies outlawed a "standing army in 
these colonies, in times of peace, without the consent of the legislature of that colony." R 
PERAY & J. COOPER. SOURCES or OUR LIBERTIES 288 (1959). This concern was reflected in all 
the state constitutions framed during the Revolutionary War. Many of the elates' provisions 
were similar to Virginia's: 
That a well-regulated militia, compoeed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is 
the proper, natural, and aafe defenaa of a free Stale; that standing armies, in time of 
pesce, should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty; and that in all caaes the military 
should be under strict subordination to, and governed by. the civil power. 
R PBRRY & J. COOPER, supra, at 312. Other states* statutes specifically referred to a "right 
to bear arms." Pennsylvania's declared, "That the people have a right to bear arms for the 
defense of themselves and the state; and aa standing armies in the time of peace are danger-
ous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up . . . ." Id. at 330. Thus, prohibiting ^landing 
armies and granting a "right to bear arms" was seen as a method of keeping the power of 
government in check. 
After the Revolution, the need for a stable and organized government grew. One of the 
main iasuee debated at the Constitutional Convention was the creation of a national army. 
Weatherup, supra note 21, at 984-95. Many feared that a national army could gain enough 
strength to impose its will on the states and the people. Id. at 989, 991 (quoting .lames 
Madison, a strong opponent of a national army). A compromise was eventually atruck that 
allowed the federal government to maintain and regulate a standing army while giving the 
states authority over the militia except when it was called into federal service. This result 
appears in article I section 8 of the United Slates Constitution: 
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forcea; 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing 
such Part of them aa may be employed in the Service of the United Stales, reserving 
to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of 
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. 
Not forgotten during the debate over the balance of power between the states and the 
No. 4) RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 761 
defending one's self.4* The following sections examine regulations 
upheld under state individual right provisions, and apply the three 
approaches to determine the scope of the individual right to bear 
arms under Utah's new amendment. 
A. Place and Manner Restrictions 
A wide variety of laws restricting the place and manner in 
which firearms may be carried have been upheld in states guaran-
teeing an individual right. Among the most common regulations 
upheld are prohibitions against carrying concealed weapons. Sev-
eral state constitutions guaranteeing an individual right expressly 
disavow a right to carry concealed weapons.4* In other individual 
right states, statutes that prohibit carrying concealed weapons 
have been upheld as valid exercises of state power.90 
A few individual right states prohibit any carrying of certain 
weapons. A Texas statute prohibits a person from "intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly" carrying a "hand-gun, illegal knife, or a 
club."*" Such an act, ordinarily a class A misdemeanor, is a third 
degree felony if it takes place on any premises where alcoholic bev-
erages are sold.** This regulation has been upheld as a valid exer-
cise of legislative authority, enacted "with a view to prevent 
crime.M§* Connecticut forbids a person from carrying a "pistol or 
federal government was the iaeue of the balance of power between the people themselves 
and the new government. Even though the Constitution was ratified, the iaeue of a govern* 
ment militia was not resolved until paaaage of the second amendment. 
48. The origin of the self-defense purpose for bearing arms ia unclear. Blackatone rec-
ognized a relation between possession of arms and self-defense, although the laws of Eng-
land greatly controlled the right to bear arms. Rohner, supra note 21, at 62 (citing Joaeph 
Story, who claimed that the English right to bear arms was "more nominal than reaJ, aa a 
defensive privilege"). A sounder justification for the initial recognition of self-defense as a 
reason to hear arms is the Americen frontier experience, which led to a dependence on guns 
for survival. Note, supra note 34, at 192-93. 
49. The Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi. Missouri, Montana, and New Mexico consti-
tutions specifically deny the right to carry concealed weapons. See infra app. at pp. 778-79. 
60. See State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612 (1840); People v. Cravea. 23 III. App. 3d 762, 320 
N.E.2d 95 (1974), aff'd, 62 III. 2d 393. 342 N.E.2d 371 (1976); Ex parte Thomas. 21 Okla. 
770, 97 P. 260 (1908); State v. Kelley, 36 Waah. 2d 772, 220 P.2d 342 (1950); tee also AIUI. 
Rev STAT ANN § 13-3102 (Supp. 1985) ("person commit* misconduct involving weapons by 
. . . |c|arrymg a deadly weapon except a pocket knife concealed on his person"). 
51. TF.X PENAL COOK ANN. | 46.02 (Vernon 1974). 
52. Id 
53. Roy v. Sute , 652 S.W.2d 827, 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Colline v. SUU, 601 
S W,2d 876. 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Masters v. SteU. 663 S.W.2d 944, 946-47 (Tex. Ct 
App. 198.1); *ee oito Clark v. Stale, 527 S.W.2d 292, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (upholding 
constitutionality of provision increasing the degree of the crime for carrying a weapon on 
premiaes whereon alcohol is sold). 
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revolver upon his person" without a permit, unless done within 
one's "dwelling house or place of business."*4 Arrests and seizures 
of weapons under this statute have also been upheld in the face of 
the Connecticut Constitution, which provides that "(e)very citizen 
has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state."1* 
Regulations prohibiting weapons on certain premises also are 
upheld frequently. Such prohibitions preclude carrying weapons in 
"any casino, bar, bank, cabaret, theatit, park, school or play-
ground;"M during any "demonstration being held at a public 
place;"*7 in "any public establishment or (while) attending any 
public event;"** at an "election polling place on the day of any 
election;"** "within any building in which . . . the general assem-
bly, . . . a legislative hearing . . . or official offices of any member, 
officer, or employee of the general assembly are located;"*0 "in any 
place which is licensed to sell intoxicating beverages;"*1 and "on 
the campus, college or school grounds, or within two miles 
thereof."*1 
The above list is not exhaustive** and indicates that an indi-
The application of IhU eaction ia aomewhat uncertain, however, hecauee of confusion 
over what conetitutee "carrying " Compart Summerville v State, 301 S W 2d 913. 913 (Te i 
Crtm App 1967) (pistol in glove compartment of car not in "possession" of defendant). 
with Courtney v S U U , 424 S W 2d 440, 441 (Tex Cnm App 1968) (weapon in the glove 
compartment u "on or about" the person) 
The Urma handgun, illegal knife, and club are statutorily defined Tex PENAL C O D I 
A N N I 46 01 (Vernon 1974 at Supp 1986) 
64 C O N N G E N STAT | 29 35 (1985) Exception! art allowed for peace officers, sheriffs, 
parole officers, federal marshals, or law enforcement agents, and members of the armed 
forces when such people are in pursuit of their official duties Other exemptions apply for 
the carrying of a pistol or revolver incidental to required travel Id 
55 C O N N CONST art 1, | 15 See State v Williams, 157 Conn 114, 249 A 2d 246 
(1968) (upholding conviction for carrying a pistol without a permit), cert denied, 395 U S 
927 (1969). tee also I I I A N N S T A T ch 38 $ 24 1(1) (Smith Hurd Supp 1986) (prohibiting 
the carrying of any "bludgeon, black jack, slung shot, sand club, sand bag, metal knuckles, 
throwing star, or any knife, commonly referred to as a switchblade knife"), State v Brown, 
173 Conn 254, 377 A 2d 268, 271 72 (1977) (requiring the stale to show that pistol meets a 
statutory definition of being less than twelve inches in length) 
56 In re Dubois, 84 Nev 662, 445 P 2d 354, 356 (1968) (upholding a conviction for 
violation of a Reno city ordinance) 
67 A I A Cooi | 13A 11 69(b) (1962) "Public place" is defined as "|a)ny place to 
which the general public haa acceaa and a right to resort for business, entertainment or 
other lawful purpose" Id | I 3 A 1 1 69(a)(4) 
68 A K U R I V STAT A N N f 13 3102(A)(8) (Supp 1985) 
69 Id $ 13 3102(A)(9) 
60 C O L O Rev S T A T f 18 12 105(1 He) (1973) 
61 I I I A N N STAT ch 38. | 24 1(8) (Smith Hurd Supp 1986). 
62 Miaa Coos A N N f 97 37-17 (1972) 
63 See. eg. OKLA. S T A T A N N tit 21 , | | 1272 1, 1277 (West 1983) (prohibiting posses, 
•ion of weapons "in any ealabluhment where beer or alcoholic beverages are consumed" ami 
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vidual right state can prohibit carrying or possessing weapons in 
virtually any public area. The justification typically advanced for 
upholding such regulations is that states and communities have a 
strong interest in deterring crime.*4 This justification, however, is 
advanced principally by Texas courts, where the right to bear arms 
guarantee specifically empowers the legislature to enact provisions 
"with a view to prevent crime."** States where case law is currently 
lacking, however, may appropriately rely on the balancing test to 
uphold place and manner restrictions. A court could determine 
that the public benefit derived from prohibiting weapons in court-
rooms, shopping centers, and many other public places outweighs 
the right of an individual to protect himself, his property, or the 
state in those public places. Further, the historical purposes for 
assuring a right to bear arms—maintenance of a militia, govern-
mental deterrence, and self-defense—are arguably less important 
today than in colonial or frontier times. The need to maintain a 
militia is largely undermined by the sophistication of modern war-
fare. Today's armies are highly trained and are skilled in the use of 
weapons unsuitable for private use. Private possession of arms may 
serve as a deterrent to invasion, but the historical significance of 
the need for a militia is largely inapplicable today.** 
Place and manner restrictions currently in effect in Utah in-
in "any church . schoolroom circus public exhibition . . ballroom social 
gsthering election or . political convention") (see Spear* v State, 44 Okla 
Cnm 406 281 P 167 (1929) (upholding conviction for carrying pistol into public gathering 
piece)), Tex PBNAL COOK A N N | 4 6 0 2 ( C ) (Vernon 1974) (increasing degree of crime to third 
degree felony if weapon carried onto premises licensed to sell alcoholic beverages) 
64 See supra cases cited in note 60 
65 T E X CONST art I, | 23, see infra app at pp 779 
66 <?rr City of Salina v Blakaley, 72 Kan 230, 83 P 619. 620 (1906) (staling that an 
individual right to bear arms based on the need for citizens to be accustomed to their weap 
on* overlook* the fact that every state has organised and drilled military resources). Note, 
tupra note H. at 190 91 Rut tee B DAVIDSON T O K K E F AND BEAR A R M S 27 28 (1969) (au 
thor claims that the frustration of American troops in Vietnam was due, in large part, to the 
poor marksmanship of troops caused by the lack of experience with weapons in the general 
citizenry) 
The deterring of governmental oppression facet has also lost some validity in light of 
advances in modern weaponry Chances are remote that citizens could repel an attack by, or 
lead a charge against, organized military forces equipped with highly potent weaponry But 
tee Note, tupra note 34, at 191 92 (arguing that private weapon possession still has a deter* 
rent eiTerl on governmental action) 
Time has also changed the eelf defenae justification for the right to bear arma Weapons 
sre certainly not needed for dey-to day survival, although recent national debate surround* 
ing vigilante type "subway shootings'* haa brought this laaua to the nation's attention See 
Machine Gun USA, NEWSWEEK, Oct 14, 1985, at 46 
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elude prohibitions against carrying concealed dangerous weapons*7 
and against threatening the use of a dangerous weapon in a fight" 
Therefore, Utah law is consistent with the place and manner re-
strictions imposed in other states guaranteeing an individual right 
to bear arms.** In fact, under the tests available to determine the 
validity of individual right regulations, Utah could enact further 
regulations to promote societal benefits. The Utah arms provision 
provides broader stated purposes for guaranteeing an individual 
right than any other individual right state: "for security and de-
fense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for 
other lawful purposes."70 The provision, however, further allows 
for greater legislative authority to regulate arms than is available 
in other states by stating that "nothing . . . shall prevent the legis-
lature from defining the lawful use of arms."" Utah's broad legisla-
tive power to regulate arms, the public benefit derived from 
preventing arms possession in many public places, and the declin-
ing importance of carrying weapons suggest that Utah could follow 
other individual right states by enacting laws preventing the carry-
ing of weapons in public places." 
B. Prohibiting Ownership by Certain Classes of People 
Virtually all individual right states prohibit the possession of 
firearms by certain classes of people such as felons and incompe-
67 UTAH CODI ANN | 76 10 504 (Supp 1986) A dangerous weapon u defined as "any 
iUro that . . u capable of causing death or serious bodily injury" Id { 76 10 601(2)(a) 
See 8 U U v Williams. 636 P 2d 1092 1094 95 (Utah 1981) (weapon need not I* on defend-
ant's person to violaU statute, can be in satchel within reach of driver of car) UTAH CODS 
ANN IS 76 10 509, 5)3. 518 (1978 & Supp 1986) outline the requirement* for obtaining a 
license to carry a concealed weapon 
68 UTAH CODI ANN | 76 10 506 (1978) 
69 See supra notes 49 63 and accompanying text 
70 UTAH CONST art I, 5 6 
71 Id Many I U U constitutions expressly prescribe the scope of the legislature s regu-
latory power For example, Oklahoma allows the legislature to regulate "the carrying of 
weapons " OKLA CONST art, 2, | 26 Mississippi provides the legislature the power to "regu-
late or forbid carrying concealed weapons " Miss CONST art. 3, 5 12 The Utah Constitution, 
however, appears to give the legislature unlimited authority to regulate all uses of weapons 
The phrase "lawful use of arms" is the focal point of the legislature's power to regulate and 
is not denned in the Utah Coda The phrase arguably limits the legislature's power to regu-
late only the actual discharge of a firearm Thia interpretation la unlikely and unsound be* 
causa it would essentially invalidate all current Utah arms regulations except the prohibi-
tion on discharging a firearm from a vehicle See UTAH COOK ANN | 76 10 508 (1976) Such 
an interpretation would exceed any other individual right to bear arms interpretation 
72 For a list of public places where weapons are barred by other individual right 
states, see tupra notes 56 63 and accompanying text 
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tents.7" Such statutes illustrate that an individual right to bear 
arms is far from absolute. Felons and incompetents have a need to 
hear arms for defense of self, property, and the state equal to that 
of normal citrons, yet the great weight of authority reflects the 
belief that the danger created by weapons in the hands of these 
persons outweighs the benefit of allowing them to defend them-
selves or others.74 
Utah follows other individual right states by prohibiting the 
possession of weapons by noncitizens of the United States, felons, 
drug addicts, and those declared mentally incompetent.'* The 
Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this provision 
in State v Vlacil by claiming that it is "quite evident from the 
language . . . set forth [in the former right to bear arms provision] 
that the legislature had sufficient power to enact the statute in 
question."7* This prohibition on possession undoubtedly remains 
71 See Mason v State, 29 Ala App 1. 103 So 2d 337 (1956) (holding constitutional 
an Alabama statute prohibiting possession of pistols by those committing or attempting to 
commit a violent crime and drug addicts or "(h)abitual drunkards"), off d, 267 Ala 607, 103 
So 2d 341 (1958). cert dented. 358 U S 934 (1969), State v. Raecon, 110 Ariz 338, 519 P 2d 
37 (1974) (upholding repealed Arizona law similar to current Arizona statute that prohibits 
felons from possessing weapons), People v Tenono, 197 Colo 137, 590 P 2d 952 (1979) 
(holding constitutional a Colorado statute prohibiting poeeeeeion of essentially all weapons 
by certain felons), In re Ephraim, 60 III App 2d 848. 377 N E 2d 49 (1978) (holding consti-
tutional an Illinois statute prohibiting poeaeaeion of concealable weapon by person under 18 
years of age, and further prohibiting possession of weapons by felons, those under 21 years 
of age convicted of a misdemeanor, narcotic addicts, thoae who have been in a mental hospi-
tal within the past five veers, and those persons mentally retarded I I I AN*N STAT ch 38, | 
24 1 I (Smith Hurd 1961)). State v Vainio, 466 A 2d 471 (Me 1983) (upholding Maine stat-
ute prohibiting weapon possession by one convicted of crime committed with u»e of weapon 
mnd puni«hahle by one year or more imprisonment), cert denied 467 U S 1204 (1984), 
Baker v State, 394 So 2d 1376 (Miss 1981) (upholding sentence of life imprisonment of 
felon in possession of wespon in viohtion of Mississippi statute), In re Dubois, 84 Nev 562, 
44S P 2d 154 (1968) (upholding conviction under statute prohibiting ex felons from possess-
ing weapons), McGuire v State, 537 S W 2d 26 (Tex Cnm App 1976) (holding constitu-
tional Texas statute prohibiting weapon possession by those convicted of »n act of violence 
or threatening violence), State v Luther, 31 Wash App 589, 643 P 2d 914 (1982) (uphold 
ing ronMction under Washington statute prohibiting possession of a ' short firearm or pis 
tol' by one convicted of a crime of violence or a felony in which a firearm was used) 
Federal law aleo prohibits importers, manufacturers, dealers or collectors from selling or 
delivering a firearm or ammunition to anyone under 16 years of age (or 21 years of age if the 
firearm is a rifle or a shotgun or the ammunition ia for a rifle or a shotgun), nonresidents of 
the seller's licensing state, those under indictment or convicted of a crime punishable by 
more than 1 year in prison, fugitives, drug addicts, and mental incompetent* 18 U S C f 
922 (bid) (3), (d)(1)-(4) (1982) 
74 See. eg. People v Trujillo, 178 Colo 147, 497 P 2d 1, 2 (1972) 
75 UTAH CODI ANN | 76-10 503 (1978) 
76 State v Vlacil, 645 P 2d 677, 680 (Utah 1982), State v Beorchia, 530 P 2d 813, 814 
(Utah 1974) 
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valid under the new arms right because of the legislature's broad 
regulating authority77 and the fact that all other individual right 
states have determined that an individual's right to bear arms is 
outweighed by the public benefit derived from prohibiting posses-
sion by felons and incompetents.7* 
C. Prohibiting Certain Types of Weapons 
Historically, the types of arms prohibited, despite state consti-
tutional guarantees, have been those unrelated to maintaining a 
militja.79 Thus, arms guarantees applied to those weapons used in 
"civilized warfare and not those used by the ruffian, brawler, or the 
assassin."*0 While the historical standard may retain some validity, 
the idea of allowing an individual to possess grenades, bazookas, 
tanks, intercontinental missiles, or other forms of weaponry em-
ployed in modern "civilized warfare" reveals the inadequacy of the 
historical standard for justifying arms regulation. 
In response to this problem, states, municipalities, and courts 
have resorted to defining and enumerating the types of arms pro-
hibited. These weapons include short-barreled rifles and short-bar-
reled shotguns,*1 poison gas," bombs,** grenades,*4 rockeU,** 
mines,** silencers,*7 machine guns,** nunchakus,** blackjacks,*0 me-
77 See $upra note 71 
78 See iupra case* cited in note 73 
79 Pierce v State. 42 Okla Criro 272. 275 P 393, 395 (1929) 
80 275 P at 395 
81 Vaequas v S u u , 649 S W 2d 647 (Tei Ct App 1982), ALA. CODS | 13A-I1 63 
(1976) (Alabama aUo prohibit* the concealed possession of bowie knives, air gum, braaa 
knucklea, and alingahou Id | | 13A 11 50. 53), ARIZ REV STAT ANN {f 13 3101(6)(d), -
3102(A)(3) (1956). ILL ANN STAT ch 38, § 24 1(a)(7) (Smith Hurd 1961), Miss Coot ANN | 
97 37 1 (1972) (if concealed or partly concealed) 
82 Ami REV STAT ANN f { 13 3I01(6)(a), 3102(A)(3) (1956), I I I ANN STAT ch 38, | 
24 1(a)(3) (Smith Hurd 1961) 
81 Miller v District Court. 191 Colo 404, 566 P 2d 1063 (1977), People v Green. 96 
III 2d .134, 450 N E2d 329 (1981), McClane v SLetc. 170 TV* Trim 603, 343 S W 2d 447, 
cert dented 365 U S 8)6 (1961), ARIZ REV STAT ANN }g 13 3)01<6)(a)(i), 3102(A)(3) 
(1956), Mo ANN STAT | 671 100 (Vernon 1979) 
84 People v Greene, 96 III 2d 3)4. 450 N E 2d 329 (1983), ARIZ REV STAT ANN SI 
13 3IO|(6)(a)(u), -3102(A)(3) (1956) 
85 ARIZ REV STAT ANN | | 13 3)01(6)(a)(ui). -3102(A)(3) (1956) 
86 Id Si 13 3101(6)(a)(iv), -3102(A)(3) 
87 Hurfinee v State, 646 S W 2d 612 (Te* Ct App 1981), ARIZ REV STAT ANN | | 
13 3)01(6)(b). 3102(A)(3) (1956), 111 ANN STAT ch 38. \ 24 1(a)(6) (Smith Hurd 1977), 
Miss CODE ANN | 97-37.1 (1972) 
88 Mornaon v Stale, 170 Tex Cnm 218. 339 S W 2d 529 (1960), ARIZ REV STAT 
ANN | f 13 3101(6)(c), 3102(A)(3) (1956). CONN GEN STAT | 53 202 (1985), I I I ANN STAT 
ch 38 | 24 1(a)(7) (Smith Hurd 1977), LA REV STAT ANN J 40-1752 (Weal 1977), M E REV 
No 4) RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS 767 
tallic knuckles,*' switchblade knives,*" BB guns** and, spring 
guns ** Statutes that enumerate prohibited weapons, however, are 
by no means exhaustive and fail to expressly prohibit possession of 
many types of modern weaponry. To cure this problem, "catch-all" 
phrases are often added to statutes to make ordinary objects "such 
as a razor, a baseball bat, or a mechanical tool"** prohibited weap-
ons if they are used in a dangerous way.** 
One court has held that prohibited weapon statutes do not in-
fringe on an individual's right of personal or public defense be-
cause of the public benefit in preventing crime.*7 Most state stat-
utes prohibiting certain weapons, however, have been challenged 
only for vagueness and not as violations of a right to bear arms." 
In Quihci v Morton Groue" however, the Seventh Circuit 
found that a town ordinance that completely banned the posses-
sion of handguns did not violate a provision of the Illinois Consti-
tution guaranteeing an individual the right to bear arms. In up-
STAT ANN tit 17-A. | 1051 (1964), Miu CODE ANN | 97 37-1 (1972), Mo ANN STAT | 
571 105 (Vernon 1979) 
89 State v Swanton. 129 Ariz 131, 629 P 2d 98 (1981). But $ee City v Shindledecker, 
99 III App 3d 571, 426 N E 2d 413, 415 (1981) (holding that "karate eticke" are not prohib 
lied dangerous weapons) 
90 People v Brown. 253 Mich 637, 235 N W 245 (1931), People v Noma. 40 Mich 
App 45, 198 N W 2 d 430 (1972), Pierce v State, 42 Okla Cnm 272. 276 P 393 (1929), 
COLO REV STAT S 18-12-102(2), (4) (Supp 1984), CONN GEN STAT J 63-206 (1985), I I I , 
ANN STAT ch 38, $ 24 1(a)(1) (Smith Hurd 1977). M I M CODE ANN $ 97 37 1 (1972) 
91 People v Brown. 253 Mich 637. 235 N W 245 (1931), Pierce v. State, 42 Okla 
Cnm App 272 275 P 393 (1929). COLO REV STAT § 18-12-102(2), (4) (Supp 1984), CONN 
GEN STAT f 63 206 (1986) 111 ANN STAT ch 38. | 24-l(a)(l) (Smith-Hurd 1977), TEX. 
PENAI COUF ANN § 46 06 (Vernon 1974), WASH REV CODE ANN | 9 41 260 (1977) 
92 TONN GEN STAT | 63 206 (1986) 
93 Id 
94 In ANN STAT ch 38, J 24 1(a)(5) (Smith Hurd 1977). WASH REV CODE ANN { 
941 180 11977) 
95 State ex rel Will..mi v City Court, 21 Ant App 318, 619 P 2d 71. 72 73 (1974) 
96 W State v Sima, 80 Miaa 381, 31 So 907 (1902) (concluding that a brick ia a 
prohibited deadly weapon even though not expreaaly mentioned by the statute), People v 
Fort. 114 III App 2d 3S0. 256 N E 2d 63, 66 (1970) (concluding that a atone and a bottle 
were prohibited deadly weapons) But tee City v Shindledecker, 99 111 App 3d 671 426 
N E2d II. 15 (1981) (warning that the unlawful weapons statute "is not intended to make 
the poftseftsion of every tool, implement, or aporting device . an unlawful weapon"), 
Brown v Slate, 105 Miaa 367, 62 So 353, 353-64 (1913) (a razor ta not a prohibited weapon 
«hen simply concealed in a pocket) 
97 People v Brown, 253 Mich 637. 235 N W 245, 247 (1931) 
98 See eg. State v Swanton. 129 A m 131, 629 P 2d 98. 98 99 (1981) (finding statute 
prohibiting possession of nunchakus not void for vagueness), People v Greene, 96 III 2d 
314. 450 N E 2 d 329, 331 (1983) (prohibited poeeeeaion statute not unconstitutionally 
vague) 
99 69*) F2d 261 (7th Cir 1982), cert dented. 464 U S 863 (1983) 
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lolding the ordinance, the court focused on two significant factors. 
First, the court found that the Illinois Constitution "grants only 
he right to keep and bear arms, not handguns."100 Second, the 
:ourt relied on statements made in legislative proceedings when 
he Illinois right to bear arms provision was adopted. The legisla-
t e history indicated that the individual right provision was 
Iesigned to prevent "an absolute ban on all firearms" but would 
iot prevent "a ban on certain categories."101 Because the ordinance 
lid not prohibit all firearms, the court found that it did not in-
ringe on a constitutionally protected right.10* 
The; Quilici decision provides a tool to justify broad arms 
>rohibitions by strictly interpreting state constitutional provisions, 
vlone of the states with a guaranteed individual right to bear arms 
xpressly provides for the types of weapons protected, and thus 
heir constitutional provisions are susceptible to the same narrow 
nterpretation given the Illinois provision in Quilici This approach 
3 supported by the fact that the public need to prevent crime has 
teen determined to outweigh the private right to bear arms for 
(rotection101 and by the decreasing historical importance of pos-
essing weapons.104 
Utah regulations currently impose no restrictions on the types 
f weapons an individual can possess. The wide range of weapons 
urrently outlawed in other individual right states indicates that 
Jtah could constitutionally prohibit many types of dangerous 
weapons.'•• However, limitations on extremely dangerous weapons 
aise the question of when traditional weapons such as handguns, 
ifles, and shotguns are dangerous enough to allow regulation. For 
xample, despite the Quilici precedent, a handgun prohibition may 
ot withstand a constitutional attack in Utah. The Illinois Consti-
Jtion is devoid of stated purposes for securing a right to bear 
rms, and legislative history indicated the possibility of some 
eapon prohibitions. The Utah provision, on the other hand, is de-
Did of legislative history and contains broad stated purposes for 
jcuring a right to bear arms. A handgun prohibition in Utah could 
100. 695 F.2d at 267. 
101. Id. The court further relied on the "home ruJe doctrine," which permit* local 
vernmenU to "exercise their police power to restrict, or prohibit, the right to keep and 
•r handgun*." Id. For a discussion of the Quiitci case. see Note, supra note 15. 
102. Quilici, 695 P.2d at 26S. 
103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
104. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
105. See supra notes SI-96 and accompanying text. 
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only he valid if a court gave the legislature virtually absolute dis-
cretion in defining the "lawful use of arms."101 
Even though a rifle or shotgun may be more effective than a 
handgun in self-defense or defense of property, the possible danger 
to society, especially in urban areas, may outweigh the public need 
to possess these weapons. Rifle and shotgun projectiles generally 
penetrate much farther than even the most powerful handguns.101 
This results in a greater danger of rifle and shotgun fire piercing 
through walls into adjoining homes or apartments.10* A long gun 
prohibition would be a step never before taken in collective or in-
dividual right states, but a balancing argument suggests that a 
state could determine that in urban areas, the public benefit de-
rived from banning rifles or shotguns outweighs the stated pur-
poses for bearing arms. 
D. Prohibited Uses 
Constitutionally protected ownership of a weapon does not 
validate all uses of that weapon. Prohibited use statutes vary 
widely among individual right states. Among the prohibited uses 
previously mentioned are carrying concealed weapons,,0# carrying 
certain weapons prohibited by statute,110 and carrying weapons on 
certain premises.111 Other more particular prohibited use statutes 
include banning the use of firearms while fighting in public 
places,ni prohibiting the alteration of manufacturers' identification 
numbers,n> forbidding aiming at another or negligently discharg-
ing a firearm,114 and prohibiting the exhibition of a weapon in a 
106. See supra noU 71. 
107. Kates, supra not* 18, at 261 (citing several weapons digests). 
108. Id al 261-64. Kates, who argues that the second amendment provides an individ* 
usl right to hear arms, further notes that accidental discharge of long guns is much more 
dsngerous and more likely. Therefore, the high risks associated with discharging a weapon 
in an urban area support possible prohibition of long guns and highly penetrative ammuni-
tion Id 
109 See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
110 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying test. 
111. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. 
112. ALA CODE | 13A-11-56 (1975). 
113. People v. Baet. 20 III. App. 3d 896. 314 N.E.2d 258 (1974); ALA. COOK f 13A-11-64 
(1975), Ann Jt*v STAT ANN f 13-3102(A)(6) (1956); CONN GBN STAT § 29-36 (1985); WASH 
Rxv COOK ANN 5 9 41.140 (1977). 
114. Ward v Stale, 628 P.2d 376, 378 (Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (upholding conviction 
for feloniously pointing a ft rearm that the defendant fired, hitting a gubernatorial candidate 
with a wax bullet filled with rwi paint); Cane v. State, 65 Okla. Crim. 192. 84 P.2d 807 
(1938) (upholding conviction under statute prohibiting pointing weapon at another); COLO 
RBV STAT f 18-12-106(1)(«). (b) (1973); MICH STAT ANN. | | 28.430, .431 (Callaghan 1981); 
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"rude, angry, or threatening manner."11* Notably, no state statutes 
in individual right states would prohibit the use of arms for hunt-
ing or other recreational purposes. 
Many prohibited use statutes may withstand constitutional 
challenges because the state constitutions only grant an individual 
right for limited purposes such as protection of self,11* state,11' 
property,11* and for lawful hunting and recreational uses.11* A 
court also might rely on the balancing tesC-to conclude that the 
individual right to use a weapon in all circumstances gives way to 
the public benefit derived from proscribing certain dangerous uses. 
The validity of prohibited use statutes is more troublesome in 
states that do not list specific purposes for securing an individual 
right to bear arms1*0 and in states where the right is given for "all 
lawful purposes."1*1 The problem is mitigated in states without ar-
ticulated purposes by decisions restricting the scope of the right 
granted and by the power given the legislatures to regulate the use 
of weapons.11* Not as easily resolved, however, is the proper inter-
pretation of the "other lawful purpose" provisions contained in 
three state provisions, including Utah's. The lack of precedents in-
terpreting this phrase requires a return to the three approaches 
suggested to determine the validity of prohibited use statutes.1** 
MIM CODE ANN | 97-37-29 (1972), WASH RIV CODE ANN | 9 41.230 (1977). 
116 Svkes v City of Crystal Springs. 216 MIM 18, 61 So 2d 387, 388 <I9f>2> (uphold-
ing conviction under Mississippi statute forbidding exhibition of • dangerous weapon in a 
"rude, angry, or threelening manner"), Slate v McMillan, 649 S W 2d 467. 473 (Mo Ct 
App 1983) (upholding constitutionality of stetute prohibiting exhibition of • weapon in a 
"rude, angry or threatening manner") 
116 Thoee atates apparently granting an individual right to bear arms for self-defense 
are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada. New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington, See infra app at pp 778-
79 
117 Thoee states apparently granting an individual right to bear arms for protection 
of the state are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, and Utah See id 
118 See id (state constitutional provisions for Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, Mon* 
Una, Oklahoma, and Utah). 
119 See id (state constitutional provisions for Nevada and New Mexico) 
120 See id (state constitutional provisions fJr Illinois and Ixuiisiana). 
121 See td (state constitutions for Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah) 
122 Both Illinois and Louisiana have enacted prohibited use statutes See People v. 
Greene. 96 111 2d 334, 450 N E 2d 329 (1983), LA Rev STAT ANN 5 40 1752 (West 1977) An 
Illinois decision indicates that the lack of stated purposes in the Illinois arms guarantee 
do** not guarantee absolute discretion in the use of a weapon See $upra notes 99-102 and 
accompanying taxi The Louisiana Constitution al the legislature to prohibit the carrying of 
concealed weapons, which also indicates that a lack of slated purposes does not secure an 
absolute right 
123 See $upra text accompanying notes 44-48 
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Especially relevant are the balancing test, which allows for prohibi-
tions in light of a strong public benefit, and the declining impor-
tance of the historical purposes for bearing arms. For example, the 
public benefit derived from prohibiting the discharge of a weapon 
in a dwelling or building is undoubtedly more compelling than the 
need to allow such an act under the proposition that an individual 
has a right to use a weapon for "all lawful purposes." Further, the 
prohibited uses cited above have little to do with maintaining a 
militia, deterring governmental oppression, or self-defense. 
Utah law currently prohibits carrying a concealed dangerous 
weapon,1*4 carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle or on a street,1** 
threatening use of a dangerous weapon in a fight or quarrel,,M and 
discharging a firearm from a vehicle or near a highway.1*' These 
prohibited uses obviously are unrelated to defense of self, others, 
property, or the state. The issue, however, is whether the new indi-
vidual right, assuring the use of a weapon for "all other lawful pur-
poses,*1 invalidates existing use restrictions. Again applying the 
tests previously suggested,1" Utah courts could justify existing and 
possibly future prohibited uses. First, the Utah arms guarantee ex-
pressly allows the legislature to "define the lawful use of arms."1** 
This legislative power appears unlimited because of the constitu-
tional statement that "nothing** in the constitution limits the 
power of the legislature to "define the lawful use of arms.'*1*0 Sec-
ond, a court could determine that preventing the discharge of 
weapons from vehicles, or prohibiting the carrying of concealed 
weapons, for example, provides a public benefit that outweighs the 
scope of any "lawful use.** Finally, in the absence of prior interpre-
tation of "other lawful uses" protected by an individual right, reli-
ance may be placed on the historical uses that have been constitu-
tionally protected. As noted, these uses are limited to self-defense, 
deterring governmental oppression, and maintaining a militia, all 
of which appear to be of decreasing importance.1*1 
124 UTAH CODE ANN | 76-10-604 (Supp. 1986) A dangerous weapon it defined aa 
"any item . capable of causing death or serious bodily injury " Id \ 76 10 601(1) (1978) 
125 Id % 76-10 505 (1978) 
126 Id j 76-10-506 
127 Jd § 76-10-608 
128 See tupra text accompanying note* 44-48 
129 UTAH CONBT art I, | 6 
130 Id 
131 See tupra note 66 
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E. Transfer Restrictions, Licensing, and Registration 
Restrictions on transferring firearms exist in many states with 
individual right guarantees. Among the common regulations are 
those prohibiting weapon transfers to unauthorized persons1*' and 
transfers of prohibited weapons.1" Courts have relied on the 
strong public interest in keeping dangerous weapons from certain 
people to hold these restrictions valid in the face of individual 
right guarantees.1*4 ^ 
One of the most controversial issues surrounding firearm legis-
lation is whether licensing and registration are valid exercises of 
state authority.1** The controversy is largely a result of the confu-
sion that exists in defining licensing and registration. There are es-
132. Bernethy v. Walt Filler'., Inc. 97 Wuh. 2d 929. 653 P.2d 280. 2S3 (1982) (up. 
holding Washington law prohibiting transfsrs to certain persons and stating that "one 
should not furnish • dangerous instrumentality such a* a gun to an incompetent"); ALA. 
COOI SI 13A-11-67, -76 (1976) (prohibiting transfer of a piitol or bowie knife to minora, one 
convicted of a crime of violence, drug addicU, habitual drunkard*, or thoae of unaound 
mind); ARIZ RJFV. STAT. ANN. { 13-3102 (1956) (prohibiting tranafer ot deadly weapon to 
specified persons); CONN GIN. STAT. | | 29-33 to -34 (1985) (prohibiting aalee to alien* and 
minora); I I I . ANN STAT. ch. 38, | 24-3 (Smith Hurd 1961) (prohibiting aale to minora, par-
aona under 21 convictad of a misdsmeanor, narcotic addicts, felona, mentally retarded per-
aona, or unaUbie persona); LA. Rarv. STAT ANN | 40:1784 (West 1977) (comprehensive filing 
requiremenU on all transfers); MICH STAT. ANN | 28.420 (Callaghan 1981) (prohibiting sale 
to minors); Mia*. CODS ANN f 97-37-13 (1972) (prohibiting transfer to minor or intoiicated 
parson); OKLA, STAT. ANN t i t 21, | | 1273, 1289.12 (West 1983) (prohibits tranafer to minors, 
fslons, intoxicated parsons, and "disturbed persons"); Tax. PBNAL CODS ANN. | 46.07 
(Vernon 1974) (prohibiting sale to one intending to commit unlawful act, minor, or intoxi-
cated person). 
133. Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 IU. 562, 116 N.E. 182, 186 (1917) ("sale of deadly 
weapona may be absolutely prohibited under the police power of the state"); People v. 
Brown, 253 Mich. 537, 235 N.W. 245 (1931) (upholding statute prohibiting sale of machine 
guns, silencers, bleckjecks, bombs, etc.); ALA CODS | 13A-11-77 (1975) (requiring seller of 
pistol to forward application of puxchsse to chief of police before the pistol can be delivered 
to the purchaser); CONN. GEN STAT | 53-206(b) (1985) (requiring notice'to chief of police 
within 24 hours of the sele of a "dung shot, air rifle, BB gun, blackjack, sand bag, metal or 
breaa knuckles, or sny knifs or s •witch knifs"); I I I ANN STAT ch. 38, | 243(g) (Smith-
Hurd 1977) (delivery prohibited until 72 hours after purchase application made for conceal-
sbie weapon and 24 hours before delivery of s long gun); MICH STAT ANN | 28.421(1) (Cal-
laghsn 1981) (prohibiting sale of electronic weapons). 
134. Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 111. 562, 116 N.E. 182. 185 (1917); Barnethy v. Walt 
FsilorV Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 929. 653 P.2d 280, 282 (1982). This principle is closely related to 
the tort idea that one should not transfer to another, knowing that the other is incompetent, 
a potentially dangerous instrumentality. 653 P.2d at 283 (citing Mitchell v. Churches, 119 
Wash. 547, 206 P. 6 (1922)). 
135. Proponents of the Utah amendment argued that the revision prohibited "laws 
requiring a license to acquire or possess |constitutionally protected) arms, requiring the re-
gistration of such arms, or imposing spacial taxation on such arms." Utah Voter Information 
Pamphlet 28 (1984) (arguments by Senator Jsck M. Bangerter and Representative Donna 
M. Dahl). 
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sentially two types of licensing: restrictive and permissive. Under 
restrictive licensing, the grant of a license is discretionary; the ap-
plicant has no right to have a firearm or to receive a permit even if 
all statutory requirements are met.,M Permissive licensing, on the 
other hand, entities the applicant to a license unless he falls into 
expressly prohibited categories such as felons or minors.1*7 
Individual right states employ both permissive and restrictive 
licensing systems. Permissive licensing for handguns exists in Con-
necticut and Washington,1** whereas restrictive licensing is used in 
Alabama, Maine, and Nevada.1** The restrictive licensing used in 
these states, however, is not entirely restrictive because it only ap-
plies to carrying concealed'4* or certain dangerous weapons.Ml The 
restrictive system, which calls for a subjective analysis of the appli-
cant by the licensing authority, is not required in any individual 
right state to purchase a standard firearm, i.e., a rifle, shotgun, or 
pistol of ordinary make and usage. The purchase of a standard 
firearm is interrupted in Connecticut and Washington, however, to 
make sure the purchaser does not fall into one of the statutorily 
prohibited possessor categories.14* 
Registration is often mistaken for licensing but only requires 
that owners identify themselves and their weapons to the desig-
nated authority.141 Many individual right states employ a registra-
tion system that generally requires a seller ta keep a record of the 
purchaser's name, address, occupation, place of birth, time of 
purchase, and the caliber, make, model, and manufacturer's num-
136 Kstas, $upra note 18. at 284. 
137. Id. at 264-66. 
138. CONN G I N STAT | 29-33 (1985) (to purchase a handgun, a purchaser must spply 
for s license, which is grsnted unless the purchaser has a prior felony conviction); WASH. 
Rev Cone ANN. i | 9.41.070, .090 (1977) (handgun purchaser must present s license on 
purchete, which is granted unless purchaser has bean convicted of short firearm or illegal 
piatnl rwwi«*«tton, is undsr 21 ysars of ags, is subject to court order regsrding rtresrms, is it** 
on bond or personsl recognizance pending trial, or has an outstanding wsrrant for his 
srreat). 
139. ALA CODE \ 13A-11-73, -76 (1975) (license to carry pistol concealed or in vehicls 
at discretion of county sheriff); MB Rev STAT. ANN tit. 26. f f 2031, 2032 (Supp. 1984-85) 
(license requires s finding of "good moral charactar"); Ntv. R«v. STAT \\ 202.350, .400 
(1983) (permit issued by county sheriff on showing of good causa) (constitutionality of stat-
ute upheld in Hsrns v. State, 83 Nev. 404, 432 P.2d 929 (1967)). 
140 Licensing in Alabama and Maine is only required for concealed weapons. Set 
$upra note 139. 
141. Licensing in Nevads only applies to sawed-off shotguns, machine guns, tear gas, 
and other like weapons. See tupra note 139. 
142. See tupra note 138. 
143. Kates, mpra note 18, at 266. 
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r of the firearm purchased.144 
Judicial interpretation of registration and licensing require-
mta is limited in individual right states.14* One court, however, 
B sustained the validity of a Chicago registration requirement 
spite arguments that registration had no deterrent effect on 
me and reduced one's right to self-protection.14* Nevertheless, 
J limiU of trjese requirements remain unknown due to a lack of 
istitutional challenges. Therefore, returning td the criteria previ-
aly suggested for measuring the validity of regulations under an 
lividual right147 provides some insight on the arguments 
rented. First, the power retained by some legislatures to regu-
e arms despite the individual right guaranteed may sustain the 
idity of registration and licensing.14* Second, the public benefit 
*ained from registration and licensing requirements may out-
igh any infringement on a stated purpose for securing an indi-
ual right.149 Third, the declining importance of the historical 
>d to bear arms may weaken the arguments against registration 
1 licensing requirement*.1*0 
While this area awaits further judicial interpretation, it is 
*r that several individual right states impose registration re-
rements on all weapons.1*1 Licensing, however, is only imposed 
limited types of weapons1*1 and in limited circumstances.1** A 
trictive licensing system to purchase certain weapons, i.e., a sys-
i that would require the subjective judgment of an authority re-
144. See, eg., ALA. CODB | 13A-11-77 (1975); CONN GEN. STAT. | 29-33 (1985); I I I . 
STAT ch. 38, | 24-4 (Smith-Hurd 1977); LA. REV STAT. ANN | 40;17S3 (1977); MICK. 
. ANN $ 28.429 (Callaghan 1981); Miss CODE ANN |§ 469-1, -17 (1972). 
145. Laws requiring licences to purchaae and carry weapons have often been upheld in 
ctivs righl states. See Strickland v. Slate. 137 Ga. I. 72 S.E. 260, 261 (1911); Matthewt 
au, 237 lnd. 677, 148 N.E.2d 334, 338 (1958); SUle v. Kerner, 181 N.C. 574, 107 S.E. 
223 (1921); People ex ret. Darling v. Warden, 164 A.D. 413, 139 N.Y.S. 277, 286 (1913); 
os v. City of Toledo, 19 Ohio Misc. 147, 250 N.E.2d 916, 926 (1969). 
146. Brown v. City of Chicago, 42 III. 2d 501. 250 N.E.2d 129, 13233 (1969). 
147. See §upra text accompanying notes 44-48. 
148. For example, several stale constitutions expressly disavow the right to carry con-
d weapons. See infra app. at pp. 778-79 (constitutional provisions of Colorado, Louiei* 
Mississippi, Misaouri. and New Mexico). 
49. The argument is made, however, that when the stated purposes are defense of 
property, and the state, registration and licensing greatly infringe on mn individual righl 
ir arms. Lisle of weapons and owners could be obtained by force* that could confiscate 
>ns and Isave the populace defenseless. See KaUa, supra note 18, at 266. 
60. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
51. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text. 
52. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text. 
53. Id. 
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garding the purchaser of a rifle or shotgun, would apparently in-
fringe on an individual right to bear arms.1" 
Utah law currently applies a restrictive licensing system only 
to those wishing to carry concealed weapons.1** The regulating au-
thority makes a subjective determination of "good cause" and 
"good character" before a license to carry a concealed weapon is 
granted.,M In this regard, Utah is in line with other individual 
right states imposing similar requirements.1*7 There are no other 
licensing or registration requirements under Utah law. 
Because Utah law prohibits carrying a concealed weapon,1** 
and in light of the power given the legislature to regulate arms,1** 
the license required to carry concealed weapons is expected to 
withstand a constitutional attack. The real issue in this area is 
whether gun registration would infringe on the individual right to 
bear arms provided under the Utah Constitution. Reflecting the 
analysis applied to other state provisions, Utah courts should first 
consider the regulating authority expressly granted the legislature. 
In this regard, Utah courts could interpret the Utah provision to 
provide a broader legislative power than that of any other state.1*0 
Public benefits obtained through the exercise of the legislature's 
power should then be weighed against the infringement on the 
stated purposes for securing a right to bear arms."1 It is difficult to 
conclude that registration would infringe on the Utah constitu-
tional right to bear arms because registration would only keep fire-
arms from those who ire not eligible to possess them—noncitizens 
of the United States, convicted criminals, drug addicts, the men-
tally incompetent, and minors.1" A jurisdiction not requiring regis-
tration is without means of controlling weapon possession by those 
specifically denied such right. Without registration requirements, 
there is no way to prevent the purchase of weapons by felons, drug 
addicts, or the mentally incompetent. 
164 The weapons that are immune from restrictive licensing are arguably thoee weap-
ons not subject to prohibition in any individual right sUUa. See supra text accompanying 
noUs 79-96. 
155. UTAH CODX ANN J 7610-513 (Supp 1986). 
156. Id The regulatory authorities arej county sheriffs, boards of police commisaionera, 
chisfs of police, city marshals, town marshals, or other heads of police departments. Id. 
167. See supra note 139. 
158. See supra note 67 
159. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
160 Id 
161. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
162. See UTAH CODX ANN | 76-10-503 (1978); supra notes 76-78 and accompanying 
text. 
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The argument that registration would infringe on the right to 
maintain a militia and to deter governmental oppression also 
seems inconsistent with certain historical facta. Colonial law re-
quired households to possess arms and to submit them periodically 
for inspection.'** In essence, the government knew who possessed 
weapons and knew whom to call into action in case of a national 
emergency.'" Registration today could arguably serve the same 
purpose. At any rate, history refutes the argument that privacy or 
inonymity is required to guarantee an individual right to bear 
trms. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Historical and legal analyses disclose that changing the lan-
uage of the Utah constitutional guarantee to provide an individ-
al right to bear arms means much less than some proponents of 
he amendment might believe. On its face, the Utah provision 
uarantees an individual right to bear arms for all "lawful pur-
oses."'" Nevertheless, this broad guarantee is subject to signifi-
uit limitation by the broad power retained by the legislature to 
Bflne the "lawful use of arms/*10 
Because the power to regulate arms is left solely to the legisla-
te, the legislature should act to bring Utah law in line with other 
dividual right states. Utah law is notably void of regulation con-
Dlling many types of weapons and uses of weapons that are pro-
bited in other states. Utah law also falls far short of preventing 
e use of weapons in many public establishments. Further, the 
jislature should weigh the benefits and detriments of weapon re-
lation, which is within the scope of its power under the new 
lendment. 
In essence, state constitutions guaranteeing an individual right 
bear arms may be more of a public pacifier than a grant of sig-
icant substantive rights. States have broad discretion to regulate 
(is by simply relying on the language of their constitutional pro-
ions. Further, courts are free to uphold regulations when the 
)lic benefit outweighs the stated purposes for securing an indi-
ual right to bear arms. The diminishing importance of possess-
weapons, combined with judicial and legislative authority to 
163. Kitet, tupra not* 18, at 265. 
64. Id. at 266. 
65. UTAH CONCT. art. !, f 6. 
66. Id. 
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regulate, make an individual right to bear arms more illusory than 
real. 
M. TRUMAN HUNT 
778 
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APPENDIX 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS GUARANTEEING 
AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
ALABAMA: That every citizen has the right to bear arms in de-
fense of himself and the state. Article I, § 26. 
ARIZONA: The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in 
defense of himself or the State shall not be impaired, but nothing 
in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or cor-
porations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men. 
\rticle II, S 26. 
COLORADO: The right of no person to keep and bear arms in 
lefense of his home, person and property, or in aid of the civil 
>ower when thereto legally summoned, shall be called in question; 
ut nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the prac-
ce of carrying concealed weapons. Article II, § 13. 
CONNECTICUT: Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense r
 himself and the state. Article I, § 15. 
ILLINOIS: Subject only to the police power, the right of the in-
viduaJ citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. Arti* 
9 I, f 22. 
LOUISIANA: The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms 
all not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the pas-
;e of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed on the 
rson. Article I, § 11. 
MAINE: Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms for the 
nmon defense; and this right shall never be questioned. Article 
i 16. 
MICHIGAN: Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for 
defense of himself and the state. Article I, § 6. 
MISSISSIPPI: The right of every citizen to keep and bear arras 
lefense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil 
er when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in ques-
, but the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed 
30ns. Article III, § 12. 
MISSOURI; That the right of every citizen to keep and bear 
i in defense of his home, person and property, or when lawfully 
noned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but 
ihall not justify the wearing of concealed weapons. Article I, § 
MONTANA: The right of any person to keep or bear arms in 
se of his own home, person, and property, or in aid of the 
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civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not be called in 
question, but nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the 
carrying of concealed weapons. Article II, § 12. 
NEVADA: Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for 
security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and 
for other lawful purposes. Article I, § 11, 11 1. 
NEW MEXICO: NO law shall abridge the right of the citizen to 
keep and bear arms for security and defense, for lawful hunting 
and recreational use and for other lawful purposes, but nothing 
herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons. 
Article II, § 6. 
OKLAHOMA: The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in 
defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil 
power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohib-
ited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature 
from regulating the carrying of weapons. Article II, § 26. 
TEXAS: Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear 
arms in the lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legisla-
ture shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with 
a view to prevent crime. Article I, § 23. 
UTAH: The individual right of the people to keep and bear 
arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property, or 
the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be in-
fringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from de-
fining the lawful use of arms. Article I, § 6. 
WASHINGTON: The right of the individual citizen to bear arms 
in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but noth-
ing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or 
corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of 
men. Article f, § 24. 
